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Mad female characters in Western literature have traditionally represented attempts by dominant 
patriarchal discourse to subjugate women’s discourse: these characters are usually pathologized 
in both their dialogue with other characters and in their physical bodies. This subjugation by 
representation of mad female characters in dominant discourse parallels similar attempts to 
portray women as lacking in humor. This thesis studies the intersections between madness and 
humor and the ability of female characters that embody both to challenge and subvert dominant 
discourse. By examining the characters of Alice from Lewis Carroll’s novel and Delirium from 
Neil Gaiman’s graphic novel series The Sandman as a progression of these ideas, this thesis 













©2017 by Tessa Swehla 
All Rights Reserved  
 
 
Table of Contents 
I. “We are all mad here”: Introduction……………………………………………….1 
II. Chapter One: Alice, Delirium, and Traditions of Subjugation of Women’s 
Madness and Humor in Dominant Discourse…………………………………….10 
III. Chapter Two: Words Don’t Mean Anything, We Just Think They Do: Semiotic 
Mistranslation as Subversive Humor……………………………………………...36 
IV. Chapter Three: “I’m just drawn that way”: Shifting Visual Representations of 
Identity………………………………………………………………………………63 
V. Conclusion: A Call for Future Study……………………………………………...86 




 “We are all mad here”: Introduction 
When the Cheshire Cat tells Alice that she, like the other characters in Wonderland, must 
be mad, she responds with skepticism and disbelief and asks it to explain why it believes itself to 
be mad. It responds, “you see a dog growls when it’s angry, and wags its tail when it’s pleased. 
Now, I growl when I’m pleased, and wag my tail when I’m angry. Therefore, I’m mad” (Carroll 
58). The Cheshire Cat’s definition of madness relies on a social construction that places 
rationality and madness on two opposing binaries: dogs represent the normative, rational 
practices of social discourse, and cats represent the opposing, non-normative, mad discourse. 
However, the Cat’s logic relies on the privileging of the dog’s discourse practices as normative, 
an assumption that cats’ practices ought to be defined in relation to the dog’s. Madness 
traditionally has been defined in these terms. It has been defined as a disease, a deviance from 
normative society, and one that posits a potential danger to the structures of reason, thus defining 
it in relationship to those structures. Madness is equated to the loss of reason, an aberration and a 
threat to both individual and public safety.  
Michel Foucault, in his early work Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the 
Age of Reason, posits that this binary opposition of reason versus madness in the construction of 
these terms in social discourse is actually a fairly recent one, that madness once existed in the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance as “an undifferentiated experience.” Foucault attempts to trace 
how madness became pathologized in the last few centuries since the advent of the 
Enlightenment: 
What is originative is the caesura that establishes the distance between reason and non-
reason; reason's subjugation of non-reason, wresting from it its truth as madness, crime, 
or disease, derives explicitly from this point…Then, and then only, can we determine the 
realm in which the man of madness and the man of reason, moving apart, are not yet 
disjunct; and in an incipient and very crude language, antedating that of science, begin 
the dialogue of their breach, testifying in a fugitive way that they still speak to each other. 
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Here madness and non-madness, reason and non-reason are inextricably involved: 
inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and existing for each other, in 
relation to each other, in the exchange which separates them (ix-x). 
 
For Foucault, reason and madness represent two parallel discourses: two distinct ways of 
viewing epistemology and social knowledge or the two-sided coin that Delirium refers to in Neil 
Gaiman’s graphic novel The Sandman (282). The key phrase for Foucault is “reason’s 
subjugation of non-reason,” a phrase which emphasizes reason’s place as part of dominant 
discourse or ideology. In modern terms, according to Foucault, madness has been reduced by this 
dominant discourse of reason to “the abstract universality of disease” thus negating its potential 
validity as an alternative discourse. On the other hand, Simon During goes on to point out a key 
difference in terminology for Foucault: “Madness (la folie) becomes the name for a condition 
which expresses a basic, not to say cosmic, lack, while mental illness is the term used to describe 
how society conceives of, and controls, madness” (26). The dichotomy is important as it looks at 
both the “experience” and the social production of madness (31). Foucault essentially in this 
work explores these social productions of madness, examining the different historical, cultural, 
and economic structures that shape the ways that society deals with the mentally ill.  
 One of the key philosophical movements that led to this social production of mental 
illness as the enemy of reason, according to Foucault, is the rise of rationalism as an 
epistemological and ontological foundation for dominant discourses of the past three centuries. 
In short, the ideology of a fixed, absolute, knowable, capitalized TRUTH has become the claim 
to authority and supremacy of dominant Western discourse and has pervaded social, economic, 
religious, and cultural discourses. Foucault writes, “A law which excludes all dialectic and all 
reconciliation; which establishes, consequently, both the flawless unit of knowledge and the 
uncompromising division of tragic existence; it rules over a world without twilight, which knows 
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no effusion…” (109). This “law” or reliance on rationalism as an epistemological authority 
shapes itself as a monologue, the one and only true discourse, thus painting any other claim to 
knowledge as false, fake news, or dangerous. The idea and term of madness here is shaped by 
this social construction of truth: madness represents a threat to this claim of authority, and any 
threat to this claim may be painted as mad. 
Although Foucault’s discussion of madness seeks to describe how dominant episteme 
seek to use madness as a mechanism of control on a broad, across the board level, feminist 
scholarship over the last several decades has focused on the intersection of gender and mental 
illness as playing a key role in the subjugation of women’s discourses in the dominant political 
and social structures.  Constructions of women as mad and of madness as having inherent 
feminine qualities have often been used by the discourse of the dominant ideology as a method 
of control through the representations of mad women (or women as mad) as threatening to the 
heteronormative, patriarchal, and capitalistic hegemony. Women are dangerous because of their 
madness, and dangerous women are mad in these literary and social constructions. And despite 
the recent efforts to de-stigmatize mental illness in societal discourse, one can still hear the 
gendered nature of madness in everyday conversation. I overheard two of my students describing 
an upcoming reading of bell hook’s Teaching to Transgress in my freshman level writing class. 
One student exclaimed to another during group work that bell hooks was crazy and that she had a 
tendency to go on “irrational rants.” I am not sure if this student knew I had overheard him or 
not, and I am not sure it mattered to him if I did, but the point remains that the link between 
women who try to critic dominant discourse and madness remains intact in the cultural 
conceptions of women. 
Part of this mechanism of the social production of gendered madness involves associating 
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danger and tragedy with madness in female characters. Characters like Ophelia, Bertha 
Rochester, Anna Karenina, Jessica Jones, etc. all are characters overwhelmed by tragedy, 
pathology, or both in their portrayals. Although “the laugh of the hysteric” has become 
associated with madness, very few mad female characters until the last several decades have 
provoked laughter on the part of the reader (although there are a great many funny mad male 
characters). This characterization is partially due to another mechanism of control of women’s 
discourse: women are not funny in dominant discourse. This dismissal of women’s humor, as 
both Nancy Walker and Regina Barreca argue, works to relegate women’s discourse to a 
subordinate and less dangerous place in social constructions. If women’s humor causes the kind 
of “trouble” that Barreca says that it does, then dominant discourse has sought to pathologize it 
in the same way it has women’s madness (They Used to Call Me 22). Although female 
comedians like Amy Schumer, Melissa McCarthy, and Ali Wong have risen to prominence in 
recent years, this dismissal can be found in almost any response to them. When the creators of 
the Adult Swim show Rick and Morty announced that they were hiring more female writers for 
the highly anticipated upcoming season, many of the fans who commented expressed fears that 
the new writers would “ruin” the show. One such commenter states, “Most successful comedians 
are male. Most successful writers that do comedy, are male…” (Dr. Jesus). Another commenter 
notes that “women just aren’t funny” and in a later comment states, “The ‘modern day feminists’ 
are literal retards,” (You Just Made The List) linking both the dominant discourse constructions 
of mental illness and dismissal of women’s humor together. 
In short, these constructions are still very much a part of the way woman are conceived 
and subjugated in the dominant discourse. The question then becomes for this thesis and for 
future analyses, how can these traditions of madness and humor, when combined into one female 
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character or text, provide new sites of subversive discourse? The characterization of the 
humorous mad-man may not be new, but the humorous mad-woman has only come into her own 
in literature and film in the past hundred years, many of these characters (though certainly not 
all) inhabiting alternative forms of media such as film and graphic novels. These characters have 
emerged in many ways as responses to these mechanisms of social control through 
disidentification with the representations of female madness and humor in the dominant 
discourse. Study of these characters can lead us to new formations of alternative discourse and 
can serve to undermine and subvert the reader’s expectations of mad women as constructed by 
dominant ideology. These constructions can be revealed for what they are (mechanisms of 
control), and the gaps that both madness and humor reveal in these constructions can be seen as 
opportunities for new discourses, epistemes, and representations in the mind of the reader. 
Although the number of female characters who embody both are growing almost daily in 
modern literature, TV, and film, I have chosen to examine two characters who embody both in 
order to explore a few aspects of how these characters might provide sites of resistance to 
dominant discourse: Alice, from Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, and Delirium, from Gaiman’s 
graphic novel series The Sandman. These two mad, female, funny characters from two different 
historical, philosophical, and cultural mindsets can begin to provide a progression view of this 
type of subversion: Alice representing a sort of prototype for mad funny female characters, and 
Delirium one of the more modern, developed examples. Alice and Delirium are superficially 
similar characters (one could probably argue that Carroll’s character influenced Gaiman’s): both 
are adolescent, white (with the exception of Delirium’s brief incarnation as a Chinese Immigrant 
Prostitute in Fables and Reflections), sexualized girls written by men whose are characterized in 
varying facets of madness and humor. They were both inspired by real-life women: Alice by 
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Alice Liddell (a child-friend of Charles Dodgson aka Lewis Carroll) and Delirium by musician 
Tori Amos (who later alluded to the character in the song Sister Named Desire), feminist writer 
Kathy Acker, and artist Jill Thompson (who illustrated the The Sandman series arc Brief Lives). 
However, their differences are numerous as well: Alice is a young girl in Victorian England who 
experiences a hallucinatory dream while Delirium is the anthropomorphic personification of 
madness and part of a mythical pantheon of similar beings. One work was written well over a 
century before the other, causing both historical and genre separation between the two. All of 
these differences pose potential problems with critically examining them together; however, 
reading the two together through a lens of the intersection between madness and humor can yield 
new insights into how alternative discourse might fill the gaps provided by the dominant one, 
thus revealing the double-sided nature of the coin that Delirium says represents different ways of 
knowing. 
Before I can begin my analysis of the specifics, the claim of Alice as a mad character 
must be defended. After all, the eccentric and colorful characters of Wonderland often seem 
closer to the madness of Delirium than Alice does; in fact, Alice can sometimes be dull and 
logical in comparison. However, if the definition of woman’s madness is a threat to the 
patriarchal order of society, and the society of Wonderland can be indeed seen as a cohesive, 
normative society (if only in relation to itself), then Alice does indeed fit this definition. She is 
consistently dismissed or perceived as a threat to the citizens of Wonderland because she does 
not conform to the accepted rules of Wonderland society. There is no indication that Wonderland 
does not follow a set of rules, rules which often parody what we could call “real world” rules. 
Internal to the community, these rules are mostly consistent: the residents understand one 
another’s language and they understand the social structure in which they are imbedded much 
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better than Alice does (although this does not prevent conflicts within the Wonderland 
community). Alice, as a human girl, provides both aberrant language (as discussed in the second 
chapter of this thesis) and aberrant ways of embodiment (as discussed in the third chapter) that 
both exclude her from this hegemony and simultaneously give her agency within it. R.D. Laing, 
the famous anti-psychiatrist, posited that madness occurs as a response to constructions that are 
in themselves equally mad: “Society highly values its normal man. It educates children to lose 
themselves and to become absurd, and thus to be normal. Normal men have killed perhaps 
100,000,000 of their fellow normal men in the last fifty years” (28). For Laing, the construction 
of the idea of the normative is just as human of a construction as the idea of the mad (echoing 
Foucault’s argument concerning the construction of binary discourses of rational discourse and 
sane). In this way, Alice can be seen as mad in the context of “the sane” residents of 
Wonderland, thus challenging the idea of who is sane and who is mad and what those terms even 
mean. 
As Gilbert and Gubar have noted, “as psychoanalysts from Freud and Jung onward have 
observed, myths and fairy tales often both state and enforce culture’s sentences with greater 
accuracy than more sophisticated literary texts” (36). No one is the master of modern myth-
telling more than Gaiman: mythology and its function as the relationship between the human 
psyche and the creation and destruction of culture and society has been the central focus of his 
work for many years, even before American Gods. Gaiman is fascinated with how humans create 
gods who create humans, and how this cycle produces as it destroys, and how myths are not 
immune to change. These explorations are at the heart of the plot of The Sandman; the 
protagonist and his siblings are where both myths and psychoanalysis both reside. As 
anthropomorphic personifications, Destiny, Death, Dream, Destruction, Desire, Despair, and 
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Delirium all create and reflect the deepest of human beliefs and impulses. The character of 
Delirium represents one of the most nuanced versions of the mythos surrounding madness: she is 
both the definition and embodiment of madness while simultaneously subverting and challenging 
those definitions and embodiments. What’s more, this personification of madness is female, 
which evokes allusions to historical ideas about hysteria and madness as embodied in women. 
Her very name (which most mental health professionals no longer use as a diagnosis) suggests an 
older understanding of madness, an indirect allusion to the creations of madness of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And the way that her subversion through humor works is 
similar to the way that Alice’s works, so using the already extensive scholarship on Alice would 
be useful in an analysis of Delirium. She too is moving through a Wonderland, but her 
Wonderland is a mythicized version of “the real” world, and she represents the other side of the 
coin of knowing that she refers to.  
 The first chapter will look at the theoretical and historical traditions that have shaped the 
dominant discourses about women’s madness and humor and how both have become 
mechanisms of alternative discourses in direct opposition to the dominant one, along with a few 
examples of how Delirium and Alice as characters interact with these traditions, creating a 
theoretical framework for later discussion. The second chapter will focus on the often humorous 
linguistic mistranslations/homophonic schema failure that occurs between Alice and Delirium 
and the other characters in their respective series and the way that the semiotic fluidity inherent 
in the dialogue of both characters represents resistance and subversion of the epistemological 
authority claimed by dominant discourse. The third and final chapter will examine the changes 
that affect the visual representations of both characters (who inhabit both text and visual worlds) 
and how these changes might bring about the disruption of the notion of fixed identity based on 
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Chapter One: Causing Trouble: Traditions of Subjugation of Women’s Madness and 
Humor in Dominant Discourse 
In Pharamond’s travel agency’s reception room in the The Sandman series Brief Lives, 
Delirium misinterprets the receptionists request to know her name as a request to take on her 
name: “You don’t want my name. Trust me, you really don’t. Sometimes, I don’t want my name, 
and I’m sort of USED to it by now. It would REALLY mess you UP” (178). Delirium, in 
Gaiman’s pantheon of anthropomorphic personifications, embodies madness, and in this scene, 
she indicates that she understands the gravity of societal definitions of madness through names—
she herself does not always want to be defined that way. As I mentioned in the introduction, it is 
telling that Gaiman named her after an older terminology for madness and that he made the 
personification of madness in his graphic novel female, for these characteristics link the 
character closely with the tradition of subjugation of women through madness. Delirium is also 
called Mania in the series, a name which again recalls an older conception of madness. Foucault 
notes that the use of the term mania was used during the classical period (a period he refers to as 
broadly encompassing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) as another reference to madness 
(125-7), but the words delirium and mania have not been used in modern psychiatry for quite 
some time. Justin Mellette, one of the few scholars who has written about Delirium as a 
character, reads this as Gaiman’s authorial “gestures towards stereotypes against women and 
mental instability. His treatment of her, however is more complex than merely classifying her as 
a victim of mental unbalance. Over the course of the series, Delirium comes to stand as a vessel 
for reader identification, open to numerous interpretations of her bizarre mental state” (64). By 
creating Delirium, the mythological anthropomorphic personification of madness, as female, 
Gaiman is able to tap into these traditions and allow the character to interact with and subvert the 
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constructions of madness in women that they have formed in the current dominant discourse, in a 
way that creating the character as male simply would not. 
These traditions of madness that developed in what Foucault’s classical period inform the 
characterizations of Alice and Delirium, and a critical approach to these characters (and those 
characters like them) must consider how these traditions formed. As mentioned in the 
introduction, a parallel to this tradition of subjugation of female madness has a parallel in the 
tradition of the subjugation of female humor: the social production of mad or funny women as 
dangerous or pathological contain many similarities and intersect in ways that I have not found 
in much theory scholarship in my own research, so it is important to discuss first how these 
mechanisms came into being and how they are related to one another. Therefore, this chapter 
will primarily focus on tracing some of the origins and some of the history of these mechanisms 
in the past couple of centuries, as well as looking at how Alice and Delirium (and by extension, 
characters like them) begin to create an intersectional framework to resists the application of 
these mechanisms in dominant discourse and the effect of this framework on the reader. It is, of 
course important to note that many cultural, social, economic, and historical shifts in thought lie 
between Alice and Delirium, complicating the relationship between the two: Delirium’s context 
contains decades of feminist scholarship that allows her to interact with these ideas in a much 
more overt and progressive way than Alice’s. However, both can be read as figures of mad, 
funny characters who expose gaps and instability in the dominant discourse, and they can also be 
read as a progression of this exposure in terms of their expression of these ideas. 
Monster Women 
Hysteria1 and delirium as words both have origins in female imagery. The word hysteria 
                                                           
1 To take a page out of Heather Meek’s article, I am using the word hysteria not as a reference to a specific condition 
or representation; the word has evolved and changed over thousands of historical, cultural, racial, social, and 
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originates from a Greek word for womb or uterus, and delirium comes from the phrase “out of 
one’s furrow” (evoking phallic imagery of plow and earth). Ancient Greek and Egyptian cultures 
formulated what da Mota Gomes and Engelhardt call “‘the gynecological explanation’” for 
mental instability: the womb was either “wandering” through the body or it contained an 
imbalance of bodily fluids, causing disease (972). Other theorists began to connect hysteria with 
the female nervous system instead of the womb (looking at it as the product of over-civilization), 
but theories connecting female sexual organs to madness persist well into the beginning of the 
19th century (973). This view of the disease was based on the assumption by medical professions 
that “women were inherently pathological” (Meek 109). The medical field viewed the female 
body as a site of weakness, of enslavement to their reproductive and faulty anatomy. The 
menstrual cycle and the uterus were closely connected with mental instability in women: the 
disorder referred to as “the vapours” was believed to be the result of imbalance in the uterus 
affecting the brain (109). This diagnosis crossed social and economic boundaries, according to 
Meek, although, as Elaine Showalter points out, the treatment and level of care often was 
dependent on the social class of the victim’s family (23). Although, as Meek notes, defining 
hysteria as a set of specific symptoms in an eighteenth-century context is difficult due to its 
almost catch-all like quality (108), Showalter says that the rise of female inmates in asylums 
confirmed “what they had suspected all along: that women were more vulnerable to insanity than 
men because the instability of their reproductive systems interfered with their sexual, emotional, 
and reproductive control” (55).  
Not only do these views of hysteria confirm biological essentialist assumptions about the 
female body, they also provide the means of social control of women. Many eighteenth-century 
                                                           
economic situations (106). Rather, the word hysteria represents the way in which madness and mental health have 
been gendered in the past several hundred years. 
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theorists, according to Meek, subscribed to the idea that marriage was the cure for hysteria, 
believing “that male semen somehow kept the womb in order” or that having children would 
cure the condition (117). Therapy became one of the means of ensuring that women would 
submit to these domestic and social roles: failure to do so could result in violent means of 
coercion, in the name of curing the ailment (116), thus punishing the mad for being mad (as 
Foucault notes on page 266). Meek writes, “Hysteria then is linked to a rebellion against 
marriage and domesticity, and…when women submit to the conventional gendered hierarchy—
usually within the married state—symptoms disappear” (118). In any case, hysteria has often 
been assigned to women as both the diagnosis and the cause of threat to men, becoming what 
Meek calls “a powerful cultural metaphor, a catch-all that explained everything that was wrong 
with women; it confirmed their inherent pathology, their weakness, their changeability, and their 
inferior reasoning” (107). Foucault described the treatment of the mad as a means of correction 
or coercion to return to what dominant ideology termed the normative order: “to return to the 
world, to entrust oneself to its wisdom by returning to one’s place in the general order of things, 
thus forgetting madness, which is the moment of pure subjectivity” (175). Hysteria or mental 
illness becomes not only a description of social or legal deviance on the part of women in the 
patriarchal discourses, but it also is solidified as part of the representation of women as a whole, 
a universal feature of their biological and social identification in the dominant ideology.  
 This gendered representation of madness continued into the 20th century and, with Freud, 
found itself tied more and more into mechanisms of control for women’s sexuality. In Freud’s 
famous case study of Dora, he explores how his theories of psychosexual trauma could lead to 
hysterical symptoms (7). In Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, Freud relates his 
treatment of an eighteen-year old woman he called Dora (a pseudonym for Ida Bauer) for 
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symptoms of hysteria: she had frequent migraines, coughing fits, depression, belligerent behavior 
with her family, and at times, an inability to speak. Her parents asked Freud to examine her after 
finding a suicide note (22-3). Freud, upon speaking with Dora, learned that her father had made 
friends with a married couple (referred to as Frau and Herr K), and that Dora claimed to have 
been sexually propositioned by the older Herr K on several occasions (beginning when she was 
fourteen) and the most recent being at a lake during a vacation with her father and the K’s. Herr 
K denied all of these accusations and instead accused Dora as being obsessed with sex (27-28), a 
symptom of madness and hysteria at the time. Although both Herr K and her father said that her 
accusations were made up, Dora explained to Freud that her father and Frau K were having an 
affair (33), and that she “had been handed over to Herr K. as the price of his tolerating the 
relations between her father and his wife; and her rage at her father’s making such a use of her 
was visible behind her affection for him” (34). Mairead Hanrahn points out that in this situation, 
Dora’s insistence on her own version of the events at the lake challenges this “tacit agreement” 
between her father and Herr K and threatens the social and personal comforts of both men while 
compromising her own (49). Thus, Dora’s diagnosis of hysteria becomes a way of undermining 
her veracity while protecting the status-quo. 
Ultimately, Dora’s case becomes a prime example of how effectively dominant 
ideological mechanisms and frameworks concerning gendered madness assert and overpower 
alternative formations of gender. Hanrahn notes that while Freud appears to believe Dora’s 
version of the events rather than her father’s, he refuses to accept her explanation for her 
symptoms at face value but instead spends several pages proving that the underlying cause was 
in fact Dora’s love for Herr K. (49). Freud believes that Dora’s refusal of Herr K is a symptom of 
hysteria rather than the cause, as he believes that a sexual situation should have aroused her, and 
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instead, she repressed that arousal and reacted in a way that was “entirely and completely 
hysterical” (28). This conclusion is based on Freud’s heteronormative assumption that women 
are attracted to men, regardless of age or preference. Freud sees Dora’s symptoms as a 
“displacement of the pleasure that she had felt,” (Hanrahn 49), again playing into the idea that 
women who do not prescribe to heteronormative gender roles (or to his paradigm of female 
sexuality) then they must be mentally ill. Hanrahn argues that here “Freud is someone 
determined to see her, rather than the situation in which she finds herself, as the problem, the 
abnormality: someone moreover, who, far from being a being a neutral observer, is part of the 
system of repressing her…” (51). Dora has given Freud the reason for her illness, but as her 
explanation does not fit into the dominant discourse that Freud both espouses and contributes to, 
it is disregarded in favor of the all too familiar identification with sexual deviance on the part of 
the mad woman. It is perhaps significant that one of the symptoms of her hysteria was her 
inability to speak, since her ability to be heard was stripped from her by both her guardians and 
Freud himself. 
Alice and Delirium as characters interact with this appropriation of Dora’s speech/her 
inability to speak in two distinct ways: her voice is either excluded from the narrative by the 
other characters or her voice is appropriated by Carroll himself through memory loss. The first 
way, through exclusion, is illustrated by the Mad-Tea Party scene in the novel. There is a definite 
patriarchal feel to this scene: three male characters (who are called mad, but who appear to 
understand one another’s discourse much better than they do Alice’s) interact with a female 
character in some condescending and unpleasant ways, yet cause the audience to laugh at their 
antics. First, the group wishes to exclude her from their table, shouting “‘No room!’” (when there 
is, in fact, room) and then responding to her observation that it was rude to offer her wine when 
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there was none by explaining to her that it was rude of her to sit down without being invited (60). 
The exclusion of Alice in this scene is palpable: she is literally being denied a seat at the table, 
but the Hatter furthers this exclusion at the end of the Tea-party scene by telling her that she 
should not talk (67). One interpretation may be that she is an outsider to their community, but the 
fact that she is female and that the rest of the scene includes the male characters trying to trick 
her into linguistic traps in a rude and dismissive manner, the symbolism here can be related to 
previous theories about exclusion of women from dominant discourse. 
The second way Alice illustrates this symbolic control of women’s discourse through the 
control of her voice is through Carroll’s authorial control of her speaking voice. Alice is unable 
to remember what she had learned previously in the “real” world, and when she attempts to 
speak, she often says something that she did not mean to. An example of this disconnect between 
speech and brain occurs in the scene with the Caterpillar. Alice tells the Caterpillar that she is 
unable to remember things she has learned: “‘I’ve tried to say ‘How doth the little busy bee,’ but 
it all came different!’” The Caterpillar then asks her to repeat “You are old, Father William,” and 
Alice complies, but the words are incorrect, which the Caterpillar notes when she is finished (42-
45). These scenes of Alice attempting to speak and something very different coming out of her 
mouth represent moments in which Carroll, as the author, appropriates Alice’s voice for his own 
ends, specifically for his desire for parody. These nonsense poems that come out of the unwilling 
Alice’s mouth are elaborate parodies of specific Victorian poems that were taught to children 
like Alice in school (“You are old, Father William” parodies Robert Southey’s “The Old Man’s 
Comforts and How He Gained them”) (264). These poems were designed to teach children moral 
lessons and subscribed to a Samuel Johnson/Enlightenment theory of literature as designed to 
exemplify the right way to live. Lydia Murdoch points out Isaac Watt’s poetry as a particular 
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example of this attitude: Watt wrote poetry designed to teach children to resist what he saw as 
their “inherent” sinfulness (15), thus his poetry became a mechanism to educate children into the 
practices of dominant discourse. However, Murdoch argues that Carroll’s work resists this notion 
by “drawing on the Romantics” and rewriting some of his lyrics into nonsense and playful 
imagery (16). These parodies resist the idea of a fixed moral goal on the part of dominant 
discourses of rationalism; however, this is more Carroll’s concern than Alice’s. Alice as a 
character is unable to speak as she wants but instead must speak as Carroll writes, thus 
illustrating the control Carroll has over the character’s voice, reminiscent of the control that 
Freud and Dora’s guardians had over her voice. 
Delirium’s character also reflects the way that these traditions of madness seek to silence 
the voice of the mad. When she first appears in the graphic novel, the first words that her brother 
speaks to her are “hush, little sister,” indicating that he needs her to be present in order to have 
all the Endless at his meeting, but that he does not want her to contribute to what is said (549), 
reminiscent of the Hatter telling Alice that she should not speak. Delirium is also more reluctant 
to speak than Alice. She, like Alice, says that she has difficulty remembering things, causing 
gaps to form in her dialogue. But unlike Alice, these gaps are not co-opted by Gaiman, but rather 
she has hesitations in her speech. These hesitations take the form of frequent ellipses, umms and 
uhhhs, and sometimes “I don’t remember.” These types of hesitations indicate two influences 
that cause Delirium to lose her voice: the first is the actual memory issues, and the second is the 
way that her siblings have shaped her inability to speak by either disregarding what she has to 
say or by interrupting her and telling her to be quiet, like Destiny. Delirium herself is hesitant to 
ask Desire, Despair, and Dream for assistance with her quest to find Destruction because she 
clearly believes that they think that they are superior to her. Thus, Delirium’s voice is weakened 
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by her doubts in her own confidence, doubts that in large part seemed to be caused by her 
siblings’ dismissal of her voice. Again, this characterization of Delirium’s problems with 
speaking allows the readers to interact with the allusion to Dora who was unable to speak in 
Freud’s assessment of her condition. 
 The use of madness as a means of patriarchal control as illustrated by Freud and other 
members of the medical and psychological fields is reflected in the characterization of mad 
women in eighteenth and nineteenth century literature, characterizations that inform the context 
for Alice and Delirium. Gilbert and Gubar point out that male authors, who have controlled 
much of the dominant discourses concerning gender and madness, have often employed a binary 
dialectical approach to women’s representation as a mechanism of enforcing patriarchal 
superiority: female characters are usually figured as either angels or monsters (17). Gilbert and 
Gubar cite the anthropologist Sherry Ortner: “in every society ‘the psychic mode associated with 
women seems to stand at both the bottom and the top of the scale of human modes of 
relating’…women ‘can appear from certain points of view to stand both under and over (but 
really simply outside of) the sphere of cultures hegemony’” (qtd. 19). Gilbert and Gubar take this 
line of reasoning further into the idea of the denial of female autonomy through authorship. 
Because women cannot represent themselves in literature, they become the symbols of “those 
extremes of mysterious and intransigent Otherness which culture confronts with worship or fear, 
love or loathing” (19). These representations become the site of social discipline, of conformity, 
from the eighteenth century until the present.  
The idealized angel both represents and creates the space for women in a patriarchal 
society through what Gilbert and Gubar call “the creation of those ‘eternal feminine’ virtues” 
which regulate women’s participation in society (23). Domesticity, submission, selflessness, and 
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heteronormative views of sexuality and beauty all are embodied by this angel character in the 
dominant discourse, firmly rooted in religious language in order to create and enable the means 
of control: these so-called ideals of femininity were espoused in novels of manners such as 
Pamela, poems such as “The Angel in the House,” and even in the children’s poetry that Carroll 
often parodied. 
 If the angel-woman character represents the higher extreme of Otherness, the ideal, then 
“the monster-woman” represents the lower extreme. She “embodies intransigent female 
autonomy and thus represents both the author’s power to allay ‘his’ anxieties by calling their 
source bad names (witch, bitch, fiend, monster) and simultaneously, the mysterious power of the 
character who refuses to stay in her textually ordained ‘place’…” (28). As noted by Gilbert and 
Gubar, these characters can be both sites of the production of patriarchal control (much like the 
angel character) and the site of the subversion of that control (even when the author’s intentions 
are otherwise). As far as control goes, female autonomy and the associated characteristics of 
dominance, assertiveness, deception, etc. are all portrayed as “unfeminine” and monstrous and 
are again linked to faulty female anatomy, which is also connected, once again, to their female 
anatomy and sexuality (30) in a similar way that the patriarchal imagination link madness and 
hysteria to female reproductive organs. This “monster woman” is often equated with madness; 
Gilbert and Gubar note that in nineteenth century literature, the “monster woman” was often 
associated with “spleen” and “vapours,” two words that, in the dominant discourse, were part of 
the gendered constructions of madness (33-4). In the end, these two opposing extremes of 
Otherness function as a method of coercion to conformity: women in male authored literature are 
either “a sweet heroine inside the house” or “a vicious bitch outside” (29). By employing this 
dialectic method of constructing women’s place in the patriarchal hegemony, the dominant 
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discourse seeks to coerce women into conformity through threat of punishment of ostracism or 
ridicule, creating a separate space for them inside the ideology. Women who do not conform or 
provide alternative modes of discourse are discredited and safely locked into their place in the 
system, eliminating them as a threat to the dominant ideology. 
 Female characters are linked with monsters often in Carroll’s Wonderland and Looking 
Glass land. In Through the Looking Glass, the White King refers to the White Queen as “a dear 
good creature” and then the Unicorn, Haigha, and the rest of the King’s court discuss Alice’s 
status: 
…and he [the Unicorn] was going on, when his eye happened to fall upon Alice: he 
turned round instantly, and stood for some time looking at her with an air of the deepest 
disgust. 
‘What—is—this?’ he said at last. 
‘This is a child! Haigha replied eagerly, coming in front of Alice to introduce her…‘We 
only found it today. It’s as large as life, and twice as natural!’ 
‘I always thought they were fabulous monsters!’ said the Unicorn. ‘Is it alive?’ 
 
The Unicorn then goes on to introduce Alice as “a fabulous monster” and the court continues to 
talk about her in the third person as “Monster” (205-7). Although the court does not specify that 
Alice’s “monster” status is related to her gender, the fact that Carroll made his representative 
child female makes this designation part of the nineteenth century context of monster women 
that Gilbert and Gubar identify, much in the same way that Gaiman creating Delirium as a 
woman places her in the context of mad women stereotypes. The way that the King’s Court 
(which is completely comprised of male characters) discuss Alice as “a monster” and as “it” 
conforms to the way that Gilbert and Gubar argue that nineteenth century male authors discuss 
female characters who do not conform to social norms, as evil, pathological creatures. 
 Delirium as a character especially reflects this angel woman/monster woman identity 
split in her representational change from Delight to Delirium. We will discuss the identity shift 
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from Delight to Delirium in Chapter 3 in detail, but this shift closely mirrors the way that 
Foucault describes the shift in the way dominant discourse defined madness as an inferior 
discourse. Michael Saler’s ideas concerning disenchantment in the modern era could shed some 
light on the issue. Saler notes that the word enchantment as used in the Middle Ages 
encompassed the ideas of both “‘delight’” and “‘delusion,’” but that the move towards modernity 
(and disenchantment) reflected a view of the binary between enchantment and rationalism: “the 
binary discourse…defined enchantment as the residual, subordinate ‘other’ to modernity’s 
rational, secular, and progressive tenets” (9). As enchantment lost its value in modern discourse, 
it became more associated with groups considered inferior, such as women and the poor (Saler 
9). This disenchantment that Saler describes as part of the adoption of rationalism in dominant 
discourse reflects Foucault’s theory of the subjugation of mad discourse by rational discourse, 
and the shift from Delight to Delirium in the The Sandman mythos reflects this change in the 
valuation of these ideas. When Delirium was Delight, she has the appearance and role of the 
“angel woman” character; when Delirium remembers Delight in Destiny’s garden, she 
remembers “Dancing men came 
to me from a far world, bringing 
tribute, of birds and flowers and 
fine gems. They were grateful 
for…for what?” Dream replies, 
“Happiness, perhaps?” Delirium 
hesitates, “Mm…SOMETHING 
like that” (see fig. 1). As 
Delight, the female personification’s main subjects appear to be men who idolize her for giving 




them the enchantment, the delusion, that Saler describes, a delusion of happiness or “something 
like that.” This role encapsulates the angel woman role as transactional: the angel woman is 
idolized and worshiped for conforming to the desires and needs of the male members of society. 
However, when Delight becomes Delirium in what Mellette calls “a fall,” she becomes a much 
more monstrous image due to her nonconformity with the angel role. This shift (which we 
explore more in Chapter Three) reflects the devaluation of the mad discourse as part of the 
devaluation of enchantment: when dominant discourse no longer was “delighted” with 
enchantment, it became a sign of madness. The breakdown of the transactional value of the angel 
role is seen in a scene in which Delirium thanks an older homeless man for taking care of her 
dog Barnabas. She offers him “a present,” but he refuses saying “T’ain’t safe to ask favors of 
your kind, even if I earned ‘em. Otherwise I could find myself spitting out flower petals and 
silver dollars every time I speak.” The old man clearly knows who Delirium is (he is mad as 
well; he says that he is “kind of yours anyway”), but he is unwilling to take anything from her, 
thinking that he could be endangering himself (60). This scene shows that Delirium does not 
have the transactional value in the man’s mind that perhaps Delight may have had, thus 
illustrating the breakdown of the system. 
 On the other hand, these monster characters can also function as subversive to the 
paradigm in which they have been placed. This subversion is especially apparent when placed in 
the hands of women writers (who often struggle to resist this binary representation), but Gilbert 
and Gubar note that this subversion can be read even the work of male writers whose “monster” 
female characters become too big for the page. Gilbert and Gubar also argue that the monstrous 
woman characterization is a mechanism of subversion in the way that she reclaims her agency 
and reasserts the validity of her alternative discourse: “a life of feminine submission, of 
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‘contemplative purity,’ is a life of silence, a life that has no pen and no story, while a life of 
female rebellion, of ‘significant action,’ is a life that must be silenced, a life whose monstrous 
pen tells a terrible story” (36).  It is here that a gap in the dominant discourse exists; alternative 
discourses (usually feminist ones) can resist the enclosure of the mad woman in the identification 
of monster by embracing the danger the figure poses to the dominant discourse. Through 
disidentification, subversion can occur. We will see that Alice performs this disidentification, but 
Delirium takes it to another level by subverting stereotypes of madness while simultaneously 
being the personification of madness. 
One such disidentification occurs in Helene Cixous’ reclamation of the figure of Dora. In 
the 1970’s, the French feminist movement sought to reclaim hysteria as a transgressive and 
subversive act on the part of women. Her play Portrait of Dora seeks to rewrite and call into 
question Freud’s analysis by avoiding what Hanrahn calls “the universalizing effect of the 
narrative standpoint adopted by Freud in his text” (52). She writes of Cixous’ version of Freud as 
someone who is determined to read himself and a patriarchal version of the events in question on 
the subject of Dora: “not only in that his sympathies lie explicitly with the one person, K, whom 
she considers responsible for her suffering, but that just as the others see her as a means to their 
sexual gratification, Freud uses her as a means to his intellectual gratification” (51). By giving 
Dora and other characters in the play voices and by showing different interpretations and 
reinterpretations of the same events, Cixous calls into question the “neutral observer” persona of 
Freud and allows Dora to subvert the voice of Freud with her own, revealing him to be part of 
the systemic controls placed on her by the designation of madness. Her inability to speak at times 
becomes a site of resistance to Freud’s explanations instead of sites of subjugation. Dora’s 
speech reveals an alternative form of discourse, one that is shaped by its conflict with the 
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dominant discourse and inhabits the gaps and spaces of that discourse.  
Echoing Foucault’s formation of madness as “a flight from the world,” Gilbert and Gubar 
suggest that in Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, madness is portrayed as an escape from injustice 
and imprisonment (341). They suggest that madness in the novel stands in for repressed rage on 
the part of the heroine, reflected in several other female characters throughout the novel such as 
Ms. Temple, Helen Burns, and culminating in Mr. Rochester’s mad wife Bertha (345). Gilbert 
and Gubar see Jane and Bertha as doubles: Bertha represents all the rage and suppressed 
autonomy that Jane feels (361-62). This rage is also reminiscent of Freud’s description of Dora’s 
“rage” towards her father upon being commercialized in his exchange with Herr K. So, here, 
female madness can also be the physical and emotional expression of anger towards the 
dominant ideology that both controls them and pathologizes them. This feminist reading of the 
rage of the monster woman or Dora at not having a voice, at not having a mechanism to counter 
the dominant culture with the alternative discourses available to women, can provide another site 
of subversion through anger, an anger that will be important as we discuss the interactions 
between Alice, Delirium, and the other characters in their respective novels. 
The Trouble that Women’s Humor Makes 
This anger also provides us with an intersection between madness and humor in our 
discussion of Delirium and Alice. Neither character likes to be laughed at: Alice often thinks that 
the characters who make fun of her are rude and unfeeling, and Delirium especially exhibits 
paranoia and sometimes anger when she suspects that one of her siblings is laughing at her 
(showing a progression from the discomfort of Alice to the outright fury of Delirium). When she 
is introduced in the prologue to Season of Mists, she screams at Desire “Don’t laugh at me” 
during a family meeting (17). She says of Dream in the first issue of “Brief Lives” that “I’m 
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always scared he’s laughing at me, behind his face” (140). The dismissal of her alternative mode 
of discourse provokes the rage and anxiety that Gilbert and Gubar espouse in their framework of 
representations of female madness. Rage is an important part of the function of the tradition of 
women’s humor, and much of that rage comes from the dismissal of women’s discourses through 
the perpetuation of the representation of women as incapable of humor in the tradition of 
dominant discourse. Just as women were pathologized mentally and physically in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, their production of humor and their ability to appreciate 
humor has also been greatly critiqued and dismissed in dominant discourse. Nancy Walker in her 
book A Very Serious Thing: Women’s Humor and American Culture discusses the historical and 
social factors that have shaped the cultural view that women are incapable of producing or 
appreciating humor. She notes that critical collections of humor almost always leave out the long 
tradition of female comics; one of the most important factors in this suppression, in her view, is 
that “humor is at odds with the conventional definition of ideal womanhood. Humor is 
aggressive; women are passive. The humorist occupies a position of superiority; women are 
inferior” (12).  Barreca quotes Reginald Horace Blyth as a representative of this attitude towards 
women; he claims that “women are the undifferentiated mass of nature…and they are the 
unlaughing at which men laugh’” (qtd. in Untamed and Unabashed 14). Thus, women’s voices 
that sought to find expression in humor are silenced in the same way that Freud’s voice silences 
Dora’s. 
This representation of women as unfunny has many similarities to the angel/monster 
paradigm that Gilbert and Gubar present as the literary tradition of knowledge production for 
societal control of women: in fact, Barreca calls this “the Good Girl/Bad Girl split” (They Used 
to Call Me 8). She notes that, while there are a few exceptions, 
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when there is a witty woman in a man’s novel, she is all too often a version of Becky 
Sharp: sexually manipulative, slyly nasty, and emotionally dishonest. Or she is the 
generic discount-hooker-with-a-heart-of-gold, just a phase a man goes through before he 
gets to the love of his life. In contrast to the wild and witty woman—one thinks of the 
endless and nameless barmaids populating both the English and American novels—the 
hero inevitably chooses to marry the witless woman with whom he will settle down—and 
for whom he settles. The bad woman with the sense of humor is shut out of domesticity; 
she forfeits the right to a husband when she makes her first wisecrack (17). 
 
In this framework, female characters (when written by male authors) who are humorous are the 
monster women; they are removed from the patriarchal structure because they refuse to conform 
to the rules that make them suitable for heteronormative domesticity. They are a threat to the 
systems of power and thus have been often demonized in the same way as mad women have: 
Barreca links women’s laughter with danger by citing the mad laughter of Bertha “as she goes to 
burn down her husband’s house” (Untamed and Unabashed 22). What Barreca calls “the witless 
woman” is linked to the patriarchal ideal of the angel: this type of female character does not 
question the authority of the system and thus is not presented as a threat. Instead, she usually 
becomes successful through marriage, that is, successful within the institution that the dominant 
discourse has assigned her. Thus, humor joins the ranks of such unfeminine qualities as 
assertiveness and autonomy. Here again is the intersection between madness and humor: they are 
both used in female characterizations to form mechanisms of control over characteristics that the 
patriarchal ideology wishes to eliminate. 
 Barreca also sees humor as a locus of social control for women: jokes have often been on 
women more than not, as another form of social control. Barreca illustrates this idea by telling a 
story about a professor who challenged her during a question/answer session at a conference: he 
says that the political and social climate had changed from when he first started teaching to the 
end of his career, restraining the kinds of jokes he could tell in the classroom for fear of what he 
called “‘feminist humor police.’” He then tells a joke the punchline of which heavily relied on a 
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stereotype concerning the garrulous nature of women: “How do you know if a skeleton was a 
male or a female?...If the mouth is open, it’s a woman. They never stop talking!” Barreca 
responds by pointing out that this type of joke actually becomes part of the means of social ideas 
about the voice of women in the classroom: “And can’t you see that the first time this young 
woman wants to raise her hand to ask a question or make a point, she might hesitate because she 
doesn’t want to appear to you like one of the non-stop talking bag-of bones you described 
earlier?” (Untamed and Unabashed 13). Barreca here demonstrates how humor can be used as 
mechanism to produce social constructs about women that in turn serve to discourage women 
from engaging in autonomous activity such as asserting an opinion in a classroom environment 
(in much the same way the monster woman representation was used as a specter to silence 
women).  
 This particular method of ideological control through humor has another method of 
silencing its opposition: if a woman challenges the joke or does not find the joke funny, she is 
accused of not being able to “take a joke.” If a woman (or man, but this response is much more 
common for women) object to the stereotype or control inherent in the joke then there must be 
something wrong with her. Barreca credits this view of women as humorless as a reaction by 
male authors and readers to women not finding them funny; if women do not find a joke told by 
a male author humorous, the joke is not considered unfunny, but the woman might be (7). This 
mechanism of control is similar to that of the use of hysteria as a means of societal control in the 
nineteenth century medical fields: all protest or deviance from accepted social normative 
behavior is explained through a perceived biological weakness on the part of women: in this 
case, that they are not able to comprehend humor. 
This use of the perception that a relationship between women and humor is tenuous (if 
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not incompatible) is reflected in Delirium’s paranoia and anger at being laughed at. She does not 
want to be the butt of the joke of the dominant discourse because it lessens her agency and 
authority within the dominant ideology. It is with Dream that the root of her paranoia is revealed 
for what it is: she sees his laughter as a method of superiority, of control. When Dream 
apologizes to Delirium for his distracted behavior, she asks him if he is making fun of her: “All 
that apologizing. You’ve never apologized to me. You just act like you know stuff I don’t know 
that makes everything you do okay” (163). This quote illustrates that Delirium understands the 
mechanism of control that the patriarchal discourse (here represented by her older brother) exerts 
over her: Dream believes that he is superior in reason and knowledge to Delirium (based on 
Foucault’s understanding of the preference of reason in dominant discourse) and thus can 
disregard and override her opinion. This statement also challenges patriarchal superiority about 
perceived female weaknesses that are confirmed in jokes about the hysterical woman and the 
“you can’t take a joke” woman representations: if one acts like one know things that women do 
not know, then one has power. The Mad Hatter provides a parallel example of this attitude in 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. He treats Alice as inferior based on what she does not know, 
thus excluding her from the discourse of the tea-party (but more on that in Chapter Two). If 
dominant discourse can define women as inferior, then the construction of superiority makes 
dominant discourse able to dismiss what those women say. 
Alenka Zupancic, in her work, defines these types of humor on a more abstract level: she 
believes that comedy can challenge human epistemes concerning the nature of reality (7). 
However, she does not adhere to traditional idea of humor as being automatically subversive. For 
Zupancic, comedy can both be part of the dominant ideology and part of the subversion of that 
ideology, what she calls “true and false comedy” (30). The key difference lies in the role of 
29 
 
happiness in maintaining ideology. For contemporary ideology, the role of comedy is important 
because it provides the necessary “ironic distance” to make people believe that they are free of 
ideology, when in fact they are not (4). Zupancic argues that comedy, when used as a tool of 
ideology, functions as an invisible restraint, a way of maintaining the ideology without alerting 
the subject to its existence. 
 However, Zupancic critics the current ideology’s move to make comedy and happiness 
analogous as a useful way of maintaining the construction of normativity: “it has become 
imperative that we perceive all the terrible things that happen to us as ultimately something 
positive…Negativity, lack, dissatisfactions, unhappiness, are perceived more and more as moral 
faults—worse, as a corruption at the level of our very being or bare life” (4). She terms this 
belief as “bio-morality,” which equates happiness with good and unhappiness with evil (4). The 
difference between this idea and what she terms “the classical entrepreneur formula” is one of 
agency:  
the bio-morality mentioned above is replacing the classical notion of responsibility with 
the notion of a damaged, corrupt being: the unhappy and the unsuccessful are somehow 
corrupt…In other words, the problem is not simply that success and efficiency have 
become the supreme values of our late capitalist society (as we often hear from critics of 
this society)—there is nothing particularly new in this; social promotion of success 
(defined in different ways) has existed since time immemorial. The problem is, rather, 
that success is becoming almost a biological notion, and thus the foundation of a genuine 
racism of successfulness (4-5). 
 
Zupancic’s theory of “bio-morality” through happiness and humor as a site of control by the 
dominant ideology is remarkably similar to the pathologizing of hysteria in the nineteenth 
century. If success in the nineteenth century (if not now) for women was to be Gilbert and 
Gubar’s angel woman (quiet, domestic, subservient), then the lack of said success indicated 
corrupt or diseased biology (the monster woman). The construction of bio-morality then could be 
said to be an intersection between gendered experiences of madness and humor, and as an 
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explanation for why Barreca says that woman is accused of not being able to “take a joke.” If 
women do not find the joke funny, then there must be something wrong with them. 
 So, if subversive laughter is not analogous to happiness, then where is it to be found? 
Zupancic argues that “true comedy” questions the inviolability of the universal (referring to 
Hegel’s symbolic Universal) by demonstrating how the universal arises from the concrete 
particular (or the Material), which is itself abstract, thus demonstrating gaps in the existing social 
order (30-2). For Zupancic, “true comedy” occurs as split between the abstract and the concrete 
realizations of a universal ideal, allowing us to discover the paradoxical workings of the 
universe, both symbolic and contingent. She gives the example of a comedic story of a baron 
falling into a puddle and then immediately pretending that nothing of the sort had occurred (30-
1). For conservative comedy, the joke would focus on the unconnected dualism of the concrete 
and universal aspects of the scenario: “the aristocrat (or king, or judge, or priest, or any other 
character of symbolic stature) is also a man…The emphasis is, of course, precisely on the ‘also’: 
the concrete and the universal coexist” (30). This insistence allows the audience of the joke “an 
identification” with the ego-ideal without challenging the “purity” of the universal concept of 
aristocracy. However, “true” or subversive comedy knows that both the concrete and the 
universal are both abstract and that the universal is merely a privileged version of the concrete: 
“an aristocrat who believes that he is really and intrinsically an aristocrat is, in this very belief, a 
common silly human” (32). Here, the joke allows the audience to disidentify with the ego-ideal 
(the representation of the ideal “universal), to realize it for what it is: a construction of dominant 
discourse. 
This description of “false” and “true” comedy can be applied to humor both as told in the 
form of jokes or in narrative humor. The joke the professor told Barreca can serve as an example 
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of what Zupancic calls “false” or “conservative” humor: the concrete skeleton with its mouth 
open serves as a symbolic representation of the (supposedly) universal concept that women talk a 
lot. It reinforces the dominant ideology through showing a dualistic relationship between the 
universal and the concrete, rather than questioning the universal as an extension of the concrete. 
The stereotype of women being talkative is “the ego-ideal” and the joke, through the concrete 
image of the skeleton with its mouth open, allows the audience identification with the universal 
without questioning the sanctity of that universal. Carroll’s parody of authority figures in Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland provide an example of the opposite, Zupancic’s “true comedy.” By 
having figures such as a King, Queen, and other characters who, as Beatrice Turner points out, 
occupy positions of authority as adults to the child Alice (247) spout proclamations and 
arguments that Alice perceives as nonsensical, rude, and ultimately ineffective, Carroll allows 
the reader to see the “short circuit” between claims to universal authority and the tenuous nature 
of those claims, thus creating laughter.  
Barreca’s theory of women’s humor as subversive directly relates to Zupancic’s theory of 
“true comedy. For Barreca, women’s humor is “often directed at the bizarre value systems that 
have been regarded as ‘normal for so long that it is difficult to see how ridiculous they really are 
(They Used to Call Me 185). She gives the example of comedian Elayne Boosler, who in one of 
her sketches tells a subversive joke about the members of the pro-life movement: “You ever 
notice that the same people who are against abortion are for capital punishment? Typical 
fisherman’s attitude, throw’em back when they’re small and kill’em when they’re bigger” (qtd. 
They Used to Call Me 14). This joke gains its subversive edge according to Zupancic’s theory in 
its ability to show that the supposedly “sacred” right to life that the pro-lifers claim as an ego-
ideal, when compared with the concrete fishing metaphor, is really just an identification 
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constructed by the dominant ideology: it is just as human a construction as the concept of fishing 
is. Barreca finds that women can generate alternative discourses to challenge and subvert the 
systems of control the dominant discourse utilizes: “Much of women’s comic play has to do with 
power and its systematic misappropriation. Women’s humor is about our reclamation of forms of 
control around our lives” (They Used to Call Me 12). Women, according to Barreca, are able to 
do this through turning their humor towards what are often considered untouchable topics such 
as abortion, sex-education, power structures in work place environments, etc. (They Used to Call 
Me 14)  
In the end, however, Barreca points out that the very existence of female humor can 
undermine the supposed “Universal” of male constructions of reality. She writes that when men 
write about issues, these issues are generally seen as universal, human issues, whereas, when 
women write about issues, these issues are seen as strictly women’s problems (They Used to Call 
Me 22-3). She states, “In exploring laughter, women are exploring their own powers; they are 
refusing to accept social and cultural boundaries that mark the need or desire for closure as a 
‘universal’ (They Used to Call Me 30). So, women’s humor can be seen as a specific application 
of Zupancic’s theory of “true comedy” as a short circuit between this “universal” privileging of 
the male experience with the concrete experiences of women, thus revealing the privileged 
nature of the construction of “universal.” This disruption of what is considered universal reflects 
the very resistance that Foucault states madness represents in the construction of the dominant 
discourse: the rationalism that dominant discourse espouses relies on the idea of a fixed, 
universal truth as its epistemological authority. Women’s humor and madness challenge this 
authority in some very specific ways: we will explore two of those ways (linguistic and visual) in 
the following chapters. 
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Methods of Subversion 
 This chapter provides much of the theoretical context and traditions that Alice and 
Delirium exist in (though it is important to note that due to genre and chronological differences, 
the contexts vary for each character). There are two more notes that need to be made concerning 
how these characters interact with these traditions in their respective texts. 
The first is in the area of disidentification. As we have mentioned previously concerning 
Cixous’s interpretation of Dora, disidentification with the traditions of madness through humor 
allow these characters to reveal the “short circuit” between the universal and the concrete. One of 
the key points that Zupancic makes about subversive or “true” comedy is that it employs 
disidentification with the “ego-ideal” in this way. Many women’s scholars give the example of 
“the dumb blonde” stereotype as a classic example of this. Both Walker and Barreca note how 
the character Marilyn Monroe plays in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes reflects how disidentification 
works through comedy. When Lorelai returns the compromising pictures to Beekman (in which 
he was pretending to be a python strangling her as a goat), she tells him with breathless sincerity 
that she was sure “Lady Beekman would never believe you were just being a snake!” The joke 
here is not just in the pun about snakes but also in the implied joke that he is “a snake” for 
cheating on his wife. Thus, the word snake becomes symbolic for his actions and his character. 
Because Beekman only hears the first meaning, he completely misses that Lorelai is laughing at 
him and at the system that both forces and allows her to exploit him. The character as a 
disidentification with the dumb blonde allows us to see how the dominant discourse has shaped 
and informed such characters instead of merely reflecting a “universal” idea. That is not to say 
that stereotypes are not found in self-deprecating humor; however, when posed in a sympathetic 
way, these stereotypes become subversive to the dominant culture rather than supportive of it. 
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Walker discusses how women’s humor looks to the results of “cultural conditioning and 
subordination” in order to critique the cause (30). Alice begins this disidentification by learning 
how to challenge the dominant discourse of Wonderland through her confrontation with the court 
of the Red Queen, but Delirium especially gains agency through her disidentification with the 
identity constructed for mad women in dominant discourse: both characters challenge what it 
means to be a mad female in dominant discourse by taking on that identity and subverting it 
through challenging the epistemological and ontological authority on which it is based. 
The second important item to note is the difference between a character who makes the 
reader laugh knowingly and a character whom the reader laughs at. Alice represents the latter 
character, while Delirium, as we have noted and will continue to note, represents both at varying 
levels.  Scholars like Barreca have observed the connection between hysteria and humor before 
in the laughter of the hysteric’s ability to turn the mirror back on the society that seeks to identify 
them as other and different and to pathologize the patriarchal construct of normalcy itself (32). 
Once you have gone through the looking glass, the constructed nature of the side you came from 
becomes apparent. However, these connections have often focused solely on the laughter of the 
hysteric instead of the laughter of the audience. Rochester’s mad wife Bertha in Jane Eyre may 
indeed laugh and laugh subversively, but the reader is not laughing with her or even really at her. 
The reader is not in on the joke. 
There appear to be two different kinds of being laughed at: dismissive laughter and 
endearing laughter. For Alice and Delirium, the laughter is directed at them by the reader; 
however, the laughter is endearing rather than the dismissive laughter that Delirium fears. This 
endearing laughter is in large part due to the likeability of the characters, directing the reader’s 
laughter away from the supposed “flaws” of the characters and focusing it on the system which 
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they are subverting. Through realizing that the identifications that they are challenging through 
laughter are extensions of the concrete, we find ourselves on the same side as Delirium and 




Chapter Two: Words Don’t Mean Anything, We Just Think They Do: Semiotic 
Mistranslation as Subversive Humor 
Near the beginning of the The Sandman series arc Brief Lives, Delirium experiments with 
language by repeating a word said to her by another character several times: “Change. Change. 
Change. Change...CHANGE. Change. Chaaaange. When you say words a lot they don’t mean 
anything. Or maybe they don’t mean anything anyway, and we just think they do” (Gaiman 129). 
Delirium’s statement illustrates an important point about the constructed nature of language and 
challenges assumptions about the cause and effect relationship between meaning (the signified) 
and words (signifiers). This same discussion occurs in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland during 
the Mad Tea Party scene, when Alice claims to be able to “guess” the Hare’s riddle (hoping to 
have some “fun”): 
‘Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?’ said the March Hare. 
‘Exactly so,’ said Alice. 
‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on. 
‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s the same thing, 
you know.’ 
‘Not the same thing a bit! said the Hatter. ‘Why you might just as well say that ‘I see 
what I eat’ is the same thing as ‘I eat what I see’!’ 
‘You might just as well say,’ added the March Hare, ‘that ‘I like what I get’ is the same 
thing as ‘I get what I like’!’ 
‘You might just as well say,’ added the Dormouse, which seemed to be talking in its 
sleep, ‘that ‘I breathe when I sleep’ is the same thing as ‘I sleep when I breathe’!” 
‘It is the same thing with you,’ said the Hatter…(Carroll 61) 
 
Alice describes her inability to understand the discourse community of the Tea-Party as 
linguistic confusion: “The Hatter’s remark seemed to her to have no sort of meaning in it yet it 
was certainly English” (62). Yet when she voices her confusion, the others ignore her and 
continue the conversation about the riddle.  
This piece of dialogue and the reactions of both Alice and the other tea party members 
tells us much about how schema disruption through language can alter views of discourse. The 
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March Hare (and his friends) here is espousing a view of language as having a fixed or absolute 
meaning, a view that John Pollack indicates is the result of Enlightenment discourse 
requirements that privilege rationalism (75). The March Hare believes that “you should say what 
you mean,” implying that the signified has a direct relationship with a signifier; in other words, 
that there is no other signifier that can accurate convey the signified. The Hatter, March Hare, 
and Dormouse’s use of Wonderland logic (defined by Turner as “a secret system that appears 
meaningless to those outside it”) is reminiscent of the use of logic/reason by dominant discourse 
to discredit the alternative discourses produced by madness that Foucault observes in Madness 
and Civilization. Alice is cowed into silence by this appeal to reason, as she is many other times 
in the narrative by characters who appeal to often flawed logic to establish their epistemological 
authority. The way that she (and then Delirium) interacts with language and dominant discourse 
that seeks epistemological authority through language is significant in its ability to disrupt the 
reader’s understanding of how language works.  
The way this disruption is accomplished in both texts is mainly focused in humorous 
dialogue between the mad female characters and the other “sane” characters in their novels. 
Humor particularly is useful when discussing the subversion of language in dominant discourse: 
Zupancic writes, “a joke also brings to the fore something in which we are embedded deeply and 
permanently, without necessarily being aware of its functioning: the paradoxical, ‘illogical,’ non-
linear and precarious constitution of our symbolic universe through speech” (142). Many 
scholars have noted that this idea is an important theme in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland’s 
language and discussions about the systems of language that are incorporated into oppositional 
discourses (and the authority that dominant discourse imbues itself with): Carroll’s linguistic 
humor undermines the idea of the inherent authority in dominant discourse by disrupting the 
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reader’s sense of language as having a fixed set of meanings. He accomplishes this in the 
framework that Zupancic applies for subversive humor by demonstrating how a character’s (or 
characters’) insistence that his or her discourse is the correct or universal one is in fact a 
privileged construction of a particular aspect of language. In other words, dominant discourse 
may claim its authority comes from the universal, but in fact, Carroll reveals through humorous 
dialogue and characterizations, this authority is an arbitrary emergence from the concrete.  
The aspect of this linguistic humor that will be the focus of this chapter occurs in the 
numerous instances of mistranslations that occur in Alice’s conversations with other 
characters—mistranslations occur when two characters misunderstand each other due to 
conflicting schemas associated with the meaning of a particular word or phrase. For Carroll, 
these mistranslations occur most frequently in the form of puns: Alice will mistranslate a word or 
phrase that a Wonderland character utters and vice versa, causing schema confusion on the part 
of Alice and schema disruption on the part of the reader through humor. Many scholars have 
written about Carroll’s use of mistranslation as a way of undermining epistemological authority, 
but very few (if any) have discussed Gaiman’s use of similar subversive mistranslation on the 
part of Delirium (who often mistranslates in the same way that Alice does via puns). These 
characters are not only showing the constructed nature of language for what it is, they are 
essentially illustrating what we might call mad discourse (in opposition to rational or dominant 
discourse) thus revealing the two-sided coin. This chapter will first explore some of the 
scholarship and analysis of how mistranslation (specifically through puns) works as a subversion 
of the epistemological authority of dominant discourse in Alice’s, and then discuss how those 
same linguistic subversions progress in Gaiman’s The Sandman to form a more overt and 
sympathetic mad discourse. 
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Puns and Mistranslation in the Dialogue of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
Dominant discourse ideology concerning the fixed nature of epistemological authority 
undermined through language in conversations between the Alice and other, more “rational” 
characters of Wonderland. Any reader of Carroll’s work is aware of his obsession with language 
and its structures: Elizabeth Sewell writes, “He is almost as much interested in the system as in 
the substance. His works are not merely in words, they are frequently about words…In his 
Nonsense world Carroll endows practically everything with the power of speech, so that endless 
exchanges of words become possible” (18). Most of these exchanges are between Alice and the 
residents and landscapes of Wonderland (although there are several that are between the 
residents of Wonderland), and humor through mistranslation is abundant in each. These 
mistranslations often also provide the most humor as these conversations reveal the conflict 
between the discourses of the characters. The larger the gap between the discourse of Alice and 
the discourse of the Wonderland character she is speaking with, the funnier the exchange is to 
the reader, who is usually laughing at both Alice and the character’s failure to communicate. 
Walter Nash describes this kind of joke as one of “‘contractual failure’” in the structures of 
discourse: “conversation…is a contract involving the agreed conduct of various acts of assertion, 
direction, performance, verdict-giving, promising, inviting, requesting, etc. When the contract is 
broken, whether innocently or designedly, the effect may be funny; may illuminate a character or 
situation; or may designate some critical defect in a relationship” (116-17). In the case of Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland, the “‘contractual failure’” between Alice and the Wonderland 
characters (and on many occasions the reader) performs all three actions, and serves to 
undermine dominant discourse claims that privilege a specific ideology and authority, in this 
case, an ideology that privileges patriarchal and rationalist discourse.  
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Nash’s “contractual failure” definition of mistranslation causes what Sameera Abbas and 
Rubina Rahman call schema disruption on the part of the reader concerning the nature of the 
conflict between mad discourse and dominant discourse (2). Schema is what J.P. Gee calls “a 
figured world,” a mental shorthand that individuals use to navigate encounters with various types 
of discourses. Gee says that these “figured worlds are linked to simulations in our minds...We 
build worlds in our minds.” He goes on to say that these mental simulations are based in social 
and cultural realities through “books and other media, in knowledge we can gain from what other 
people say and do, and in what we can infer from various social practices around us” (100). Gee 
also points out that “figured worlds” can also serve to marginalize certain experiences: “to set up 
what counts as central, typical cases and what counts as marginal, non-typical cases” (97), in 
effect constructing what is considered normalized in a particular schema and what is not. 
According to Gee and others, individual’s “figured worlds” or schemata are different depending 
on cultural, social, ideological, and a variety of other factors that create the background 
knowledge or context of that particular individual. Abbas and Rahman discuss how Carroll uses 
schema disruption to create a “text-world” with the reader and to show how a conflict between 
discourses can be caused by conflicting schemata on the part of individual characters, causing 
the “contractual failure” or mistranslation to occur. 
This schema clash is revealed the most clearly in the mistranslation that occurs in the 
“contractual failure” joke commonly referred to as a pun. A key literary marker of this 
mistranslation comes from Carroll’s use of puns as a central part of his humorous dialogue. Puns 
fell out of favor in public perception in England and Europe around the same time that Foucault 
identifies the first break in the dialogue between the discourses of reason and madness. Pollack 
in his critical history of puns writes that the privilege that Enlightenment discourse placed on 
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rationalism as part of dominant ideology did not allow for the fluidity of language demonstrated 
by puns: “puns themselves became a litmus test of one’s views on language, meaning, and the 
possibility of defining absolute truth…many came to view pun’s very ambiguity as a serious 
flaw” (75). Pollack notes that this emphasis on the fixed nature of reality, coupled with the rise 
of the printing press and a higher importance placed on language as a status symbol, discouraged 
the use of language that questioned those factors (76-9). Again, here we can see the dominant 
discourse—Foucault’s discourse of reason—exerting its epistemological authority over language 
by emphasizing the fixed nature of the relationship between language and meaning. 
This disregard for puns as flawed forms of language is a result of the same type of 
classical literary interpretative frameworks that Wolfgang Iser says that the Enlightenment 
espoused (and that have persisted into many schools of criticism even today). He writes that this 
type of framework seeks “the referential reduction of fictional texts to a single ‘hidden’ 
meaning…This paradigm took itself for granted that art, as the loftiest mode of knowledge was 
representative of a whole, if not the actual form of truth itself” (11-3). The idea that a text has a 
“fixed” meaning that the literary critic must uncover represents an ideological claim about the 
fixed meaning of language and discourse. If meaning is fixed, and dominant discourse claims to 
have found the meaning, then its claim of epistemological authority is valid. 
However, Alice’s mistranslations with the Wonderland characters illustrates that this 
claim is tenuous at best, non-existent at worst. Carroll subverts this claim by employing what 
many scholars of linguistic humor call homophonic puns. Nash defines homophony as “pairs (or 
more) of words having the same sound but different meanings, eg: rain/reign, sighs/size, 
urn/earn, need/knead (138). Abbas and Rahman explore what they call a “manipulation of 
homophony” in the Caucus race scene in chapter three of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 
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When Alice and the other characters in the group are wet from swimming in her tears, the Mouse 
tells them, “‘Sit down, all of you, and listen to me! I’ll soon make you dry enough!’” (24). Abbas 
and Rahman point out that the word dry can be used literally or metaphorically: “The reader or 
listener interprets the meaning according to context. In this instance, the word ‘dry’ should have 
been taken literally but instead the mouse uses it metaphorically and starts telling ‘dry’ accounts 
of history (6). Alice continues in this scene to mistranslate the Mouse’s dialogue through 
homophony; she mistakes tale for tail and not for knot (Abbas and Rahman 6). Alice’s schema is 
well established in these first chapters: she is a young Victorian child who has definite formed 
opinions and knowledge that she has gathered from past experience and her education. She has a 
schema related to the idea of mice: a mouse that talks and tell stories is not a part of that schema, 
so words that normally are associated with intellect and conversation are not part of the schema 
either. Instead, words relating to the anatomy of the mouse (like tail or having a knot in a tail) are 
most closely related to the image of the mouse in her schema, causing her to misinterpret those 
words. 
Carroll’s usage of puns in this scene not only is a clever humorous linguistic game; it also 
calls the assumptions of rationalist discourse into question in the same way that Iser says that “art 
and literature react against the norms of the prevailing aesthetic theory in a manner that is often 
ruinous to that theory” (11). The mistranslation through puns demonstrates that the idea of 
absolute truth (or a fixed meaning) is not only a construction of dominant ideology, but that such 
an idea is laughable. Shires discusses the importance of fantasy, nonsense, and parody in 
Carroll’s (and other Victorian writers’) use of language as a means of subverting the 
epistemological authority of the dominant discourse: “they explode or transgress the frame of 
"the real" and thus open up a space of uncertainty. Pushing toward the realm of non-signification 
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where nothing is stable, these forms open a gap between signifier and signified which makes a 
definite meaning or absolute reality impossible to attain” (267). The interactions between Alice 
and the residents of Wonderland demonstrate the multitude of discourse available based on the 
different schemas involved. Carroll explores the fluidity and multiple interpretations of language 
through many different means (such as nonsense, rhyme, etc) but the most humorous often come 
through gaps created through mistranslation through puns and similar “contractual failures” of 
language, thus causing Zupancic’s short circuit between the “universal” ideal of fixed meaning 
and the concrete disruptions of dialogue. 
Alice’s mistranslation of the Mouse’s story seems to encourage another of the characters 
of Wonderland to voice his own mistranslation of language, and in doing so, they create a 
moment of schema disruption on the part of the reader. In a rare moment of mistranslation 
between two Wonderland characters, the Mouse and the Duck get into an argument over the 
meaning of the rather vague pronoun it (Abbas and Rahman 8). The Mouse uses the word as part 
of the discourse conventions of his narrative (“the archbishop of Canterbury found it advisable”), 
but the Duck does not understand this convention of discourse and instead refers to his own 
schema when interpreting the phrase found it (“I know what ‘it’ means well enough, when I find 
a thing…it’s generally a frog or a worm”) (8). Abbas and Rahman write,  
The account narrated by the mouse is a text inside a text... The historical account does not 
carry any sense for the Duck because its schema is too different from the schema in this 
particular narrative. By exploiting the notion of schema both in the readers and his 
characters, Carroll has been able to arouse laughter among his readers (8). 
 
In other words, Alice, the Mouse, and the Duck are all using their individual schemas to translate 
each other’s dialogue into meaning, but their schemas are all so different that they are 
mistranslating one another. Because some of the words they are using are homophones, these 
words provide the site for the mistranslation, the points at which the alternate schemas and 
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discourses are revealed, causing the reader to laugh at the multiple meanings that the word it 
contains. Pollack writes that homophonic puns function in this way to create disruption of the 
reader’s desire to create a fixed narrative or schema of the text: “perhaps, more than any other 
type of humor, homophonic puns both drive and depend on this ambiguity. For a split second, 
they manage to hold open the elevator doors of language and meaning as the brain toggles 
furiously between competing semantic destinations, before finally deciding which is the best 
answer—or deciding to live with both” (52). Thus, the reader of Carroll’s dialogue realizes the 
gap involved between the respective semantic schemas concerning the word it for the Mouse, the 
Duck, Alice, and their own understandings of what that word means, thus collapsing the 
possibility for a fixed definition of what it means in the Mouse’s story, creating cognitive 
dissonance on the part of the reader and highlighting the multiplicity of schemas available in 
discourse. 
To highlight the place that Alice occupies in Wonderland discourse, Alice herself is 
aware that the mistranslation is occurring but finds herself unable to prevent it from happening 
because of the gap between her schema and the other characters. Alice herself is obsessed with 
language in Wonderland; she is constantly worried that she is saying the wrong thing and that her 
use of language will offend someone or that she will commit the crime of rudeness. This fear is 
most clear in her first meeting with the Mouse. It does not respond to her greeting at first, so 
Alice attempts to speak to it in French: “‘Oú est ma chatte?’” which was the first sentence in her 
French book (21). Alice does not realize (or consider) that the phrase “Where is my cat?” might 
terrify the Mouse (who jumps in fear) (21). In her schema, the word cat is most associated with 
her cat Dinah, a positive association with her home and her pet. The Mouse, however, associates 
cats with predator and death, and Alice realizes her mistake almost immediately, apologizing. 
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However, she continues to talk about her cat Dinah and then about a dog that kills rats due to her 
inability to separate her schematic understanding of these animals from the words she is 
speaking, causing even more fear on the part of the Mouse (22-23).  
Alice’s attempts to overcome this schema confusion become part of the dialogue 
featuring mistranslations. Her realization of the mistranslations and her inability to rectify them 
can also be seen in her conversation with the Mad Hatter about the meaning of the word time 
(63). In Alice’s real world schema, time is a unit of measurement; she relates the idea of time to 
the Hatter’s watch and keeping rhythm in music. In the Mad Hatter’s schema, Time is 
personified and takes on human characteristics. The resulting “contractual failure” results in one 
of the more fantastical exchanges between the two characters in which Alice discusses “wasting” 
and “beating” time (which horrifies the Hatter) while the Hatter discusses conversations with 
Time and how Time used to do favors for him. The joke is further extended when the Hatter 
relates a story in which he offended Time while singing: “‘I’d hardly finished the first 
verse…when the Queen bawled out ‘He’s murdering the time!...and ever since that…he won’t do 
a thing I ask!’” (64). The joke here relies on a series of mistranslations: the Queen is adhering to 
the same definition of time that Alice is (time as a unit of a measurement in keeping rhythm) but  
by using the word murder to mean that the Hatter was keeping rhythm incorrectly, Time as a 
personification mistranslated the Queen’s statement to mean that the Hatter was actually 
attempting to kill him. So, the Hatter mistranslates Alice and the Queen, and Time mistranslates 
the Hatter and the Queen, even though Time as a personified character exists as a construction of 
the Hatter’s existing schema.  
The schema disruption on the part of Alice realizing that the Hatter is discussing Time as 
a personification allows her to realize something about the Hatter’s context: it is always six pm 
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in the Hatter’s schema which is why the table is always set for tea (64). Without the realization 
of the fluidity of the meaning of the word for time, Alice’s schema and the resulting discourse 
would have remained hopelessly at odds with the Hatter’s on this particular subject, not allowing 
her to create a new schema that includes the personification of Time as part of her understanding 
of language (this process is called schema refreshment). What is problematic here of course is 
that while Alice is willing allow for cognitive dissonance and refreshment (in this scene at least) 
and to add the Hatter’s understanding of Time as a personification to her existing schema, she is 
ultimately unable to overcome the mistranslation due to the Hatter’s (who as we discussed in 
Chapter One is a representation of patriarchal discourse) unwillingness to do the same. 
This unwillingness on the part of the Hatter and many of the other characters in 
Wonderland comes from the same type of claims that rationalist dominant discourse makes for 
epistemological authority. Dominant discourse dismisses mad discourse as invalid and incorrect; 
it seeks to obliterate mad discourse rather than to give it equal epistemological value. The object 
of the Hatter, March Hare, and the Dormouse is not to understand Alice or acknowledge her 
existing schema as perhaps an alternate mode of discourse but to win the argument, to make her 
acknowledge that her use of language is incorrect. If she questions their authority in a way that 
they do not approve of (such as her asking questions about the logic of the arrangement of the 
table or the Dormouse’s story), they either dismiss her, change the subject, or tell her to be quiet, 
in a manner that I observed in Chapter One to be similar to the way that medical professions such 
as Freud dealt with hysterical patients such as Dora. 
Turner examines the tension between language and meaning in these scenes of 
mistranslation as establishing linguistic authority over Alice: “the entire narrative may be 
considered a complex linguistic joke at the expense of Alice and the reader, neither of whom 
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possesses the requisite knowledge to make sense. Whatever rules are being adhered to here, they 
are ones to which Alice is denied access, and as such she almost always comes out second best in 
the debates in which she is engaged” (247). While Turner explores in her article the tension in 
authority between adults and children in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, I would argue that 
this idea can be applied to the idea of authority through dominant discourse through schemas of 
patriarchy and mental health as well. Alice in the Mad Tea Party scene and elsewhere in 
Wonderland is actively excluded from the discourse of these three patriarchal figures not only 
based on her symbolic stature as the only female member of the group but also on the basis of 
her inability to conform to the existing constraints of their schema. She lacks authority in this 
situation because she is unable to participate in the dominant discourse because of the conflict of 
said discourse with her existing schema and the insistence of the dominant discourse that her 
schema is incorrect or invalid. What’s more, Alice recognizes her lack of authority, her 
positioning in this universe as a child speaking to adult characters, and so she is willing to defer 
to them, for the beginning of the novel, and to learn how they use language so she can too gain 
authority. 
However, it is in the opposite realization of the arbitrary construction of dominant 
discourse that Alice finally finds authority in Wonderland. The novel hints at this realization in 
the first encounter with the Cheshire Cat: when the Cheshire Cat says that it growls when it is 
happy, Alice challenges this word choice, “‘I call it purring, not growling.’” The Cheshire Cat 
responds, “Call it what you like.” (58). The Cheshire Cat, perhaps of all the residents of 
Wonderland, is the most aware of the fluidity of language and the tenuous relationships between 
signifier and signified, and unlike many of the other residents of Wonderland, is willing to 
acknowledge Alice’s alternative discourse and epistemological authority through language. It 
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appears to the be the only character in Wonderland who is willing to meet Alice halfway, and she 
begins to get angry at her treatment by the other characters in the next scene at the Tea Party, 
causing her to storm out of the party (67), again reflecting the rage that Gilbert and Gubar write 
as the madwoman’s reaction to dominant discourse. However, it is much later that Alice is able 
to assert this alternative discourse as a method of resistance to the dominant discourse in the 
courtroom scene near the end of the novel. Once she realizes that the rules of the authority figure 
of the King (who represents the dominant discourse) are simply made up and as such are 
arbitrary, she is able to resist the logical traps of the discourse by calling it out for what it is. This 
escalates until the final realization that the authority figures in this case are “‘nothing but a pack 
of cards’” (109). Alice is here able to recognize the conflation that the dominant discourse is 
making between the universal and the concrete: a pack of cards calling itself aristocracy has no 
epistemological authority for this claim; the signifier here is just a signifier.  
Perhaps most frightening here for Alice (and the reader) is the reaction of the 
representations of the dominant discourse, which, having failed at containing Alice within 
language, attempts to do so with violence: “At this the whole pack rose up into the air, and came 
flying down upon her” (109). This moment in the text also represents the potentially dangerous 
consequence of confronting the representations of dominant discourse with their own absurdity: 
physical violence as a reaction to a challenge to authority (again reflecting Foucault’s theories of 
punishment as therapy during the classical period). However, it is at this moment that Alice 
awakens from Wonderland; it is the realization of the lack of epistemological authority of the 
dominant discourse in Wonderland that allows her to escape. 
Foucault writes, “Language is the first and last structure of madness” (100). By looking at 
how humorous mistranslation is used in Alice, readers are able to glimpse the divide between 
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different types of discourse—the discourse of Alice and the discourse of Wonderland—causing 
disruption in their own schema of the relationship between rationalist discourse and mad 
discourse. Abbas and Rahman see Carroll’s novel as directly confronting the reader’s schema 
through language: “Carroll’s manipulation of social and linguistic context and schemas in this 
literary piece has created a non-sense world that disrupts the reader’s existing schema and yet 
they accept and even identify with it by the end of the narrative” (1-2). The text-world of 
Wonderland relies on the reader’s schema derived from “the real world” in order to function but 
through schema disruption creates a deviant or unknown world that can lead to new 
understandings concerning the “real world,” including new understandings about how mad 
discourse is constructed in the dominant one. In the case of Alice, her interactions with 
Wonderland and the mistranslations between her and other characters result in her learning about 
how language can subvert the epistemological authority of dominant discourse, but the real 
impact of this occurs in how these mistranslation result in the disruption of those schemas of 
epistemological authority on the part of the reader. The reader of Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland may begin to question exactly who is mad in this text and who has the 
epistemological authority in language based on this reading of mistranslation by revealing the 
tenuous relationship between language and meaning. 
Subjectivity of Alternative Discourse in Brief Lives 
Some of Carroll’s critics see the ending of the novel as a return to the dominant 
discourse, of the triumph of order and domesticity. After all, she gets to return to her Victorian 
home and society that is filled with the dominant discourse of patriarchy, a discourse that cannot 
be dismissed by simply calling it what it is.  In any case, Alice perhaps leaves us a gap that 
Delirium can fill. There is a lot of pun humor via homophony in Delirium’s dialogue that 
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functions similarly to Carroll’s usage of puns to illustrate mistranslation, and in this section, I 
will explore how Delirium as a character in the The Sandman series arc Brief Lives takes the 
disruption even farther by adding a layer of subjectivity and agency in her awareness of herself 
as the author of an alternative discourse, and this subjectivity allows a further disruption on the 
part of the reader as the linguistic games cannot be read as a simple mistake or dream.  
Gaiman’s very characterization of Delirium is associated with the fluidity of speech: her 
dialogue bubbles are multi-colored and the lettering is hand drawn in order to produce an 
asymmetrical effect (Bender 38). There are very few moments of dialogue between Delirium and 
the other characters that do not involve “the contractual failure” that Nash indicates is the basis 
of homophonic humor. An example of this mistranslation via pun occurs within the first few 
frames of her appearance in Brief Lives: we first see Delirium huddled up on a doorstep to keep 
out of the rain with an old woman who is begging passersby for money. The old woman, who is 
unaware of Delirium’s identity as one of the Endless and mistakes her for a runaway, attempts to 
converse with her but runs into the difficulty of any conversation with Delirium: mistranslation. 
When she tells Delirium to call her parents, Delirium responds that she does not have parents 
(which, according to The Sandman Overture, is technically incorrect). The old woman responds 
with the word lost as a euphemism for death: “You lost both parents? Tsk. Poor Dear.” Delirium 
does not understand euphemisms, however. She takes lost to mean misplacing an item or person: 
“I didn’t lose my parents. I lost my brother...” The old woman is still operating under the 
euphemistic meaning of the word lost: in her linguistic schemata, the word is linked to death. 
When she asks Delirium how her brother died (dropping the euphemism), Delirium responds 
angrily, “He’s not DEAD. I just lost him. Okay?” (128-9).  
Delirium here displays negative emotion when it comes to mistranslation much more 
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readily than Alice (who only becomes annoyed with a few citizens of Wonderland after her 
meeting with the Cheshire Cat), probably because Delirium has a more complete understanding 
of how her alternative discourse is considered damaged by the dominant one. She understands 
what it is like to not be heard or to be ridiculed because of mistranslation, and unlike Alice, she 
is torn between the hesitation created by the superiority of her siblings and confidence in her own 
alternative discourse (with a few exceptions) to insist on being heard. This insistence often 
comes across as rage, the same rage that Gilbert and Gubar attribute to women’s madness. 
Delirium’s rage and her willingness to stand up for herself and her dialogue contrasts with 
Alice’s initial unwillingness to offend the inhabitants of Wonderland. This shift in 
characterizations indicates the change in cultural context that exists between the two characters: 
Delirium is a character informed and shaped by over a hundred years of women’s rights 
movements and development in feminist scholarship and ideas. Thus, Delirium can be read as a 
progression of the ideas that Alice begins to explore: Alice may have to learn how to call out 
dominant discourse on its absurdity, but Delirium begins Brief Lives already able to do so. 
 Schema confusion is also an important part of understanding Delirium’s relationship to 
language and discourse, much as it is with Alice. Later in her conversation with the old woman, 
Delirium has another moment of mistranslation in a scene that closely mirrors the same type of 
mistranslation in the scene between Alice and the Hatter concerning the word time. As I have 
mentioned, the word change is an important one in Brief Lives, both its relationship to the 
characterization of Delirium (and in her shift in identity from Delight to Delirium) and to the 
series arc as a whole. When the old woman asks a passerby if they could “spare some change,” 
Delirium mistranslates the word from a term for money to a term for the metaphysical idea of 
making or becoming different, “Change. That was always kind of the problem, kind of...um 
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some days I feel like Rita Marlowe in The Wayward Bus. You ever see that movie?” (129). But 
more importantly, like Alice with the word time, she realizes that the beggar woman did not 
mean the same word that she does, prompting her to comment on how words “don’t mean 
anything anyway, and we just think they do.” She then leaves the doorway to look for her sister, 
and the beggar woman asks her where she is going. Delirium replies, “I need a change…” (129). 
This insistence on the need to make something different complements the woman’s begging for 
money. They both “need” change, a word here that is imbued with two different meanings based 
on the different understandings and requirements produced by their individual schemata. 
This scene evokes the earlier passage of Alice’s mistranslation of the word time, but it 
also continues the argument that Delirium is a progression of Alice: unlike Alice in the first part 
of her journey into Wonderland, Delirium begins her journey aware of the constructed nature of 
language. She understands the fluidity of language. Although there are many scenes in which she 
mistranslates a word, a phrase, or a meaning from other characters (to the other character’s great 
confusion and the hilarity of the audience), she is not as bewildered as Alice that she does not 
understand the other characters (or that they do not understand her). Mistranslation of the word 
change in this scene is a purposeful co-opting (or disidentification) of the signifier to signify 
something in her own alternative discourse, to use the old woman’s need for money to reflect her 
own need for (as we will find out) family who accepts her. 
Delirium herself (much like Alice) is interested in communicating despite the 
mistranslations; however, unlike Alice, she is aware that these mistranslations are a part of the 
tension between dominant and mad discourses. Much of Delirium’s dialogue takes the form of 
questions: she is constantly asking the people around her (usually her siblings) for words or ideas 
that she has forgotten. In the first chapter, she tries to verbally remember the name for “the 
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gunky stuff inside people’s. eyes” twice and then asks Despair if she remembers (the answer is 
Vitreous Humor) (138). However, Delirium also asks for the names of things that do not exist in 
the language of dominant discourse (or at least, standard English). She asks Dream at the 
beginning of chapter three, “What’s the NAME of the word for the PRECISE moment when you 
realize that you’ve actually forgotten how it felt to make LOVE to somebody you really liked a 
long time ago?” (177). A few pages later, she asks, “Is there a word for forgetting the name of 
someone when you want to introduce them to someone else at the same time you realize you’ve 
forgotten the name of the person you’re introducing them to as well?” (179). These types of 
questions are common for Delirium: the questions themselves are funny, but in contrast to 
Dream’s deadpan short answers of “There isn’t one” and “No,” they are hilarious. These answers 
indicate Dream’s strict adherence to the dominant discourse’s understanding of the rules of 
language and his dismissal of Delirium’s mad discourse as an inferior understanding of 
vocabulary; however, Delirium’s questions indicate that she understands that there is a gap 
between her discourse and the dominant one. In fact, her questions might even prompt the 
readers to reconsider why there is not a word for forgetting the name of the person you are 
introducing, thus challenging why some words exist and others do not. What is telling here is 
that the Standard English that is employed by dominant discourse does even employ signifiers 
for her signified, revealing that the way that dominant discourse constructs language is often 
based on privileged epistemological ideology. Dominant ideology which prizes reason over 
madness (as Foucault noted) does not need words for these types of experiences, so none exist. 
The comic sequence ends with Delirium asking, “Um. What’s the name of the word for things 
not being the SAME always. You know, I’m sure there IS one. Isn’t there? There must be a 
WORD for it…the thing that lets you know TIME is happing. Is there a word?” While their 
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driver says that she does not know, Dream states succinctly “Change,” thus referring to a word 
that functions as an important thematic motif in this series. Delirium replies “I was afraid of that” 
(195). Change is an important motif for both Delirium and Alice, and we will discuss how 
change is important to visual representation in Chapter Three, but in the context of our current 
discussion about language, Delirium finally is able to find a word that translates what she is 
attempting to communicate into Dream’s conception of dominant discourse. However, the fact 
that she states that this word makes her afraid indicates that his ability to translate her mad 
discourse into dominant discourse scares her. She was seeking change earlier; the concept does 
not terrify her in the same way that it does Dream. What makes her uncomfortable is his ability 
to finally pin down with one word what she has described in her mad discourse. 
Although much of the humor of Delirium occurs in unintentional mistranslation (much 
like it does for Alice), these instances of deliberate mistranslation on the part of Delirium 
illustrate her agency in her subversion of the dominant discourse, an agency that Alice does not 
possess. When Desire exasperatedly commands “pull yourself together” during one of what she 
refers to as Delirium’s “bad” moments, the divided two frames show Delirium’s annoyed 
reaction and then an image of a cloud of multi-colored butterflies in the next frame, implying 
that she burst into butterflies (see fig. 2).  This bit of humor, playing with the phrase “pull 
yourself together,” is Delirium rebelling against 
Desire’s notions of superiority by deliberately 
mistranslating her command. Desire wants 
Delirium to compose herself emotionally (to 
become more rational), so Delirium resists the 
idea of rationality (as signified by this phrase) Figure 2. Delirium "pulls herself together" in 
Desire's realm (134). 
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by mistranslating pulling together as a literal pulling together of physical form (incarnation) and 
then does the exact opposite by falling apart physically. When she does reintegrate into her 
humanoid form on the first frame of the next page, she asks Desire “I’m together. Aren’t I? I…I 
know I used to be.” Desire replies, “Yes. You used to be” (135). This implies that Desire sees 
Delirium as a broken version of her former self (Delight), reflecting the dominant discourse 
notion that madness is a disintegration of reason or health (echoing the way that Foucault states 
that rationalism defines madness as “non-being” or “nothing”) (113). However, Delirium 
responds to this assertion with “I don’t know” (135), which passively calls into question this 
interpretation. 
Delirium’s agency is further exemplified through her ability to actually make jokes 
herself using homophonic humor. When Dream visits her in her realm to apologize and convince 
her to continue to journey with him to find their brother, he finds her sitting next to a broken 
sundial with the phrase “Tempus Frangit” emblazoned across the front (268). Tempus Frangit 
means time breaks (again reflecting the themes of fragmentation) and is a pun for the saying 
tempus fugit. Although Delirium’s realm is characterized by chaos and aberrant language, sights, 
and sounds, the pun here appears to be on purpose (Delirium in Seasons of Mists remarks about 
time that “it is always in the last place you expect,” again playing with the definition of the 
word), indicating participation on the part of Delirium in the joke (556). The fact that she would 
have to be aware of the existence of the phrase tempus fugit in order to make the joke implies 
that Delirium is, through humor, subtlety acknowledging the way dominant discourse works and 
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disidentifying with it in order to create her own discourse. 
However, the key scene in Brief Lives that reveals Delirium’s agency when it comes to 
disidentifying with the dominant discourse occurs when she confronts Destiny over his treatment 
of Dream. She tells him, “There are things not in your book. There are paths outside this Garden. 
You would do well to remember that.” Destiny responds that “it is…refreshing…to see you so 
collected;” the word collected is reminiscent of Desire’s pull yourself together, again echoing the 
motif of madness being associated with fragmentation. After Destiny leaves, Dream notes that 
Delirium’s eyes are the same color (blue), to which Delirium responds, “So? I can do that. I can 
do that if I have to” (283). The visual representation of Delirium’s speech bubbles alters as well 
in this scene. Each speech bubble is a solid color instead of the shifting multi-colors in her 
previous speech bubbles, and the text inside the bubbles is much more uniform (see fig. 3).  
While Chapter Three will focus more on the changes in Delirium’s (and Alice’s) visual 
representations and how they impact the 
reader, this scene illustrates that Delirium 
understands the basis on which dominant 
discourse claims its epistemological 
authority: its construction of itself as the sole 
knowledge of fixed nature of both language 
and meaning. Destiny here stands as a 
patriarchal representation of this ideology; 
after all, he is the incarnation of knowing the rules, of knowing the secret meaning of what has 
happened and what will happen. But she challenges this authority by claiming to know things 
that he does not, things that he is unable to know due to his privileged place in his own sites of 




discourse (the book and the garden). Thus, she reveals that her madness is actually the site of an 
alternative discourse, a mad discourse that undermines the epistemological claim of the dominant 
discourse to know everything. 
More importantly, Delirium employs her understanding of dominant discourse in order to 
disidentify with it, indicating her own agency. She accomplishes this by utilizing Destiny’s own 
discourse in order to make herself heard in a way that he has to acknowledge, according to his 
own rules. She speaks here in what is traditionally seen as a rational format with no 
mistranslations or digressions points to her ability to participate in dominant discourse, showing 
that she can do so if she is forced to (she tells Dream that if he cannot do so, then she must). 
However, this position is not sustainable for her: “I don’t know how much longer I can BE like 
this. It hurts very muchly” (283). The slippage into the old speech patterns and the fact that it 
pains her to continue speaking in such a way implies that this ability is temporary because she 
herself does not fit into the mold that dominant discourse has designed for her. So, for Delirium, 
the agency that she has to recognize the existence of multiple discourses allows her to resist but 
not to fully participate in the dominant discourse. And moreover, forcing herself to reflect the 
values of the dominant discourse is painful to her. Delirium’s suffering in reaction to forcing 
herself to participate in dominant discourse norms reflects Foucault’s theory of confinement of 
the mad as a punishment for madness itself during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century: “Ultimately, confinement did seek to suppress madness, to eliminate from the social 
order a figure which did not find its place within it” (115). According to Foucault, if the classical 
understanding of madness is a “manifestation of non-being” or “nothing” (which is reminiscent 
of Delirium’s motif of fragmentation) then “confinement cannot have any other goal than a 
correction (that is, the suppression of the difference, or the fulfillment of this nothingness in 
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death)” (116). Foucault’s creation of a link between the correction of madness and death and 
elimination of the figure of the mad person is played out in the pain Delirium experiences when 
she has, to borrow Desire’s words, pull herself together. She is killing part of herself in order to 
act and speak in such a way, eliminating her mad discourse in favor of the dominant one, if only 
for a few pages. 
My last point concerns the final way in which Delirium indicates a progression from the 
way Carroll creates schema disruption on the part of the reader through language. The way 
Delirium tells stories about events in the graphic novel creates an actual representation of her 
schema as an alternative discourse through the creation of a text world that challenges the text 
world of the dominant discourse (aka the text world of the other characters and the author). The 
readers read and view the events of the graphic novel in a mostly linear way, reading each panel 
left to right, top to bottom on each page. However, there are several instances when Delirium 
relates the story over again to a newly introduced character that presents the sequence of events 
in a different light. The longest, and funniest, example of this is when Dream and Delirium 
finally find Destruction, and Delirium relates their journey to him. 
It was ME that thought of it. I thought of it in my HEAD. I thought, I MISSED 
you, and I thought, if we went to FIND you, then we’d FIND you, and that would make 
everything always BETTER for ever…So I WENT and Looked for you and First of All 
Desire was at this party and she said she wouldn’t help and then Despair showed me her 
RATS and she had a SAD man in a mirror but she wouldn’t come with me and I went to 
see Dream but First I went home and CRIED a little bit. SO I went to see Dream and I 
thought HE’D say NO but He gave me little chocolate lovers and he said okay. And we 
saw this travelling man and I made little FROGS and this lady wanted my name, and I 
went on an AIRPLANE. I LIKE airplanes. I like anywhere that isn’t a proper place. I 
LIKE in-betweens. There was a lady named Ruby only SHE got burned all up but that 
was LATER. And there was a lawyer too but HE got all burned up too. I mean he got 
squashed. And the Etain Lady ran away because her house went boom and the Alderman 
wasn’t in the world any more and I found Tiffany and She was with the DANCING lady. 
And then I did DRIVING and I was really GOOD. Then We went to the Dancing Lady 
and Dream talked to her and I made this man give Tiffany all his Dollars, then we went 
away. Then Dream said he would’nt go with me any more and I went HOME and CRIED 
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a little bit, but then he said he was sorry and really WOULD come with me again, 
because…I don’t remember. Something. And that he’d be NICE to ME. Friends. THEN 
we went to NOWHERE and then we went to Destiny’s GUARDING. And then Dream 
went all spoggly and I had to put me all…I..I HAD to…I had to be…It hurt. And THEN 
we went over there and I ate some cherries and the stones said I was going to be a 
kangaroo when I grow up and then we came HERE. So it was ME. Um. That’s all (300-
301) 
 
This rather lengthy section is remarkable because it is the longest piece of uninterrupted 
monologue that Delirium has in the entire run of the series. Twelve of the thirteen panels that 
encapsulate this monologue focus on her face: one reflects Dream and Destruction’s reactions to 
her story (their faces provide a frame of her face; see fig. 3) and a small one on the second page 
shows Dream’s shame in recollecting how Delirium stood up for him against Destiny (Brief 
Lives). Even more telling, as she relates each part of the story, the physical appearance of her 
face and hair shifts to reflect her physical appearance at each part of the journey, starting with 
her half-shaved head with orange and green streaks and ending back with her appearance thus far 
at Destruction’s house. However, her clothing remains the same: the simple white coat with no 
shirt on underneath that she has been wearing since arriving at Orpheus’s island, implying that 
she is aware of an audience and the rhetorical and physical restrictions concerning her 
storytelling. 
 This monologue indicates Delirium’s understanding of the events, and through her use of 
mad discourse, allows her to challenge the text-world that Gaiman’s graphic novel has created 
with the reader thus far. As readers, we recognize almost every part of her story as we are able to 
link it back to an event that we read earlier in the plot. However, the first sentence indicates that 
Delirium sees herself as the instigating agent of the journey to find Destruction (undercutting 
Dream’s suspicions that Desire made Delirium want to find Destruction, something both Desire 
and Delirium deny). Delirium here places herself in the position of the main protagonist of the 
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narrative. This positioning replaces the view that the reader has of Dream as the protagonist of 
the graphic series. Mellette links Delirium and Dream both to Joseph Campbell’s traits of a hero 
character but does so in order to defend Delirium as an equal partner to Dream in the graphic 
narrative of Brief Lives as a whole (69-70). However, I argue that in Delirium’s version of the 
story, she characterizes herself as the hero, and minimizes Dream’s involvement to the role of 
the side-kick or helper. In fact, in this version of events, he seems to get in Delirium’s way more 
than help her. Delirium’s retelling of the events with herself as the protagonist also forces the 
reader to reevaluate what the important events of the series were and how they actually occurred. 
Readers may have a faint memory of the scene in the airplane as one devoted narratively to 
getting the characters from one place to another, but Delirium sees it as an important scene in her 
narrative: she pauses at this scene and an entire panel is dedicated to her observation that she 
likes airplanes because they are “in-between places” (see fig. 4). The fact that she is framed in 
this image by the faces of Dream and 
Destruction as they listen to her indicate 
that here, at least, she is the focus of this 
narrative. Some of the events in her 
narrative are in the wrong order as well, 
indicating that, as the reader potentially 
suspected previously, Delirium’s perceptions of time are not the same as the reader or the other 
characters. There are also gaps in her appearances in previous scenes in the novel that she fills in 
here in her monologue, such as her crying off page in her realm. These details and positioning in 
Delirium’s narrative cause disruption with the text-world that the reader has constructed through 
the reading of the series thus far, causing the creation of a new text-world and creates doubt in 
Figure 4. One panel from Delirium's narrative (300). 
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the mind of the reader as to whose perspective should be trusted or privileged in the 
interpretation of the events of the novel. 
 More importantly, this uninterrupted block of narrative coming from Delirium distinctly 
sets her apart as a progression of Alice. Even though readers are allowed to see Alice’s internal 
monologue concerning the events of her journey through Wonderland and her reaction to the 
other characters, her thoughts are edited, framed, and commented on by the narrator’s voice—the 
two voices sometimes even fuse into one as we have noted earlier in Chapter One with the way 
that Carroll appropriates Alice’s voice during her recitation of poetry. The reader is constantly 
being told how to interpret Alice’s thoughts and dialogue by the narrator, indicating the complete 
authorial control that Carroll seeks to have over Alice (we will discuss this more in Chapter 
Three). The Wonderland characters have no interest in hearing Alice’s narrative from her 
perspective (not even the Cheshire Cat or the Caterpillar), and when she finally does relate her 
version of the narrative to her sister when she awakens, the narrator does not allow the reader to 
hear what she says, but rather gives us his summary: “And she told her sister, as well as she 
could remember them, all these strange Adventures of hers that you have just been reading 
about…So Alice got up and ran off, thinking while she ran, as well she might, what a wonderful 
dream it had been” (110). The issue with the last sentence is that it exists in the text-world that 
the narrator has created with the reader, the text-world that relies on the idea that this is all a 
“wonderful dream.” Alice may not have thought the dream was so wonderful; there were 
certainly times when she was frustrated/scared/sad. But the narrator’s interpretation of these 
adventures is privileged in the novel over Alice’s. Rackin observes that the “urbane and detached 
narrator” protects the reader from the more horrific implications of Wonderland and Alice’s 
adventure in it (116), but in the process, the narrator’s voice eclipses Alice’s. Who knows how 
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Alice actually told the story? Would it have come out more like the narrator’s version or more 
like Delirium’s? Many re-imaginings of Alice as an adult (such as in Alan Moore’s Lost Girls 
and Christina Henry’s Alice) give a different view of Alice’s adventures without the narrative 
voice of the original novel. 
 In the creation of this text-world, Delirium can been seen as the progression of the ideas 
that Carroll began to suggest in his characterization of Alice: that humor through mistranslations 
and puns create doubt in the readers as to the epistemological authority in language. By revealing 
the multiplicity of discourses available in language and by challenging the presumption of 
authority of the dominant discourse, these characters are able to disrupt the reader’s schema 
concerning the superiority of dominant discourse and the inferiority of mad discourse. This 
disruption creates cognitive dissonance on the part of the reader as to who has epistemological 
authority in these narratives (and by extension in “the real world”); however, it is only one 
example of how these characters can challenge dominant discourse. As we will see in the next 
chapter, issues of representation and embodiment as they relate to identity construction are also 




Chapter Three: “I’m just drawn that way”: Shifting Visual Representations of 
Identity 
In the film Who Framed Roger Rabbit, Jessica Rabbit says, “I’m not bad, I’m just drawn 
that way.” This moment in the film indicates the interpretative link that dominant discourse often 
attributes between visual representation of the body (in this case, the female body) and identity, 
as well as the tenuous nature of that interpretative mode: Jessica Rabbit attempts to point out the 
way that the cartoonist has created her identity through his visual representation of her (Who 
Framed). This “drawing” of identity onto visual representation that Jessica Rabbit refers to 
reflects Judith Butler’s language concerning gender/sex identity as “an enacted fantasy or 
incorporation” that is “inscribed on the surface of the body” through the repetition of various 
signifying acts on the part of the dominant discourse. She writes,  
Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally constructed, are performative in the sense that 
the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications 
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means…In 
other words, acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an 
interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes 
of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive 
heterosexuality….if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of 
bodies, then it seems that genders can be neither true nor false, but are only produced as 
the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity (173-4). 
 
For Butler, the idea of a stable gender identity produced by an interior gender identity combined 
with exterior signifiers of gender (biological signifiers) is a constructed one in the dominant 
discourse, designed as a way to produce cultural and societal norms that control the bodies and 
practices of the individual.  
The relationship between body and identity in dominant discourse is key to the 
relationship between image and character identity in graphic novels due to the way that readers 
recognize characters through the visual representation of their bodies. Will Eisner argues that the 
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visual representations of human body are actually more valuable in interpretation than the 
accompanying text (106). For Eisner, the reader’s ability to understand the meaning of the words 
involves their ability to “read” the image, particularly when it comes to the portrayal of 
characters through visual representation of their bodies: the author of the graphic novel “must 
draw upon personal observations and an inventory of gestures, common and comprehensible to 
the reader. In effect, the artist must work from a ‘dictionary’ of human gestures” (104). Eisner’s 
observation about readers’ interaction with human body language is similar to that of the idea of 
schema introduced in the last chapter. For visual texts, it is important to see the way that 
representations of body can either confirm or disrupt the schema of the reader concerning the 
embodiment of certain characters.  Jared Gardner argues that there is a binary tension in comics 
and graphic novels between image and words and that “all comics necessarily leave their binary 
tensions unresolved. It is at heart a bifocal form, requiring double vision on the part of reader and 
creator alike” (176-7).  The way that the body is portrayed in the textual descriptions of the 
character as well as visual representation of those descriptions create in the text-world of the 
reader a sense of character identity, based on the reader’s schema that attempts to compare the 
image with images from past experience in order to create meaning. 
As we have discussed in Chapter 1, embodiment and identity have been interconnected 
issues in the way that dominant discourse has shaped and subjugated mad discourse in the past. 
Hysteria, delirium, and any nonconformity to heteronormative sexual or gender roles were 
treated as a manifestation of the pathology of the female body, thus mad bodies were constructed 
as monstrous. So, in this chapter, I will explore how both the visual representations of Alice and 
Delirium challenge reader’s expectations concerning the embodiment of identity through 
changes and fragmentation in their visual representations, in their subversion of the dominant 
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discourse that views identity and bodies as fixed modes of interpretation.  
While the The Sandman series are classically graphic novels, Carroll’s novels can be read 
as proto-graphic novels because of the original illustrations by John Tenniel. Many other editions 
have had new illustrations, and there are a few film adaptations as well, emphasizing the 
visuality of this particular text. Both Delirium and Alice themselves are inextricably linked to 
visual representation, both in the written text’s descriptions of their bodies and in the visual 
representation of their bodies in drawings and images. Alice herself is drawn primarily the same 
way in Tenniel’s original illustrations and in visual adaptations of her character (with a few 
exceptions): she is pictured as an adolescent girl with long blonde hair and a dress (in many 
adaptations, this dress is usually blue), an apron, white stockings and black Mary Jane style 
shoes. Delirium is consistently recognizable by her mismatched eyes (one blue and one green), 
her often overlarge punk grunge garb and her multicolored speech bubbles. However, these 
representations undergo change and fragmentation both in the written text and in the images. 
Alice experiences significant changes in stature and size due to eating and drinking different 
substances in Wonderland, while Delirium 
constantly changes the color and length of her 
hair and her clothing throughout the series 
(sometimes even mid page or even panel; see 
fig. 5). I will explore how these representations 
and their subsequent alterations and changes 
cause the characters to evolve their own 
conceptions of their self-identity as well as how they interact with the construction of their 
identity by other characters. 
Figure 5. Delirium often changes visually 




Growing and Shrinking in Alice’s: Visual Representations of the Child/Adult 
The growing and shrinking of Alice’s body in the textual and physical representations of 
her character functions as points of identity confusion on the part of Alice and causes her to 
examine how the two are related. When Alice first shrinks in the narrative, she does so in what 
appears to be the fulfillment of a wish that she could “shut up like a telescope” in order to pass 
through the small door (13). She then almost immediately sees a bottle that instructs her to drink 
the contents, and after checking to mark sure it does not advertise itself as poison, she drinks it. 
As she shrinks, she echoes her earlier wish by comparing the act of shrinking to “shutting up like 
a telescope’” (14). These changes in size result in Alice questioning her identity; she worries 
about how far she will shrink: “‘for it might end, you know,’ said Alice to herself, ‘in my going 
out altogether, like a candle. I wonder what I should be like then?’ And she tried to fancy what 
the flame of a candle looks like after the candle is blown out, for she could not remember ever 
having seen such a thing” (14). The telescope metaphor continues when she grows (due to eating 
a cake) and she says that she is “opening out like the largest telescope that ever was” (16). This 
comparison of her body to inanimate objects allows Alice to express her confusion over her lack 
of control over the size changes in her body, but more importantly, they suggest a fragmentation 
and externalization of her ideas about her identity as uniquely tied to her body. The comparison 
of the idea of her shrinking into physical nonexistence to that of the snuffing out of a candle 
flame also calls into question Alice’s self-conceptualization of her own identity if she becomes 
non-corporeal (symbolic of course of her own death). What part of her is left if her body 
disappears? Where is the line between body and identity? These questions reflect Butler’s 
assertion that dominant discourse has constructed a fixed identity through its narratives inscribed 
on the body; when the body can change in such an abrupt and unnatural way, this construction of 
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identity is called into question. This fragmentation of self-conception of identity continues in 
Alice’s personification of individual body parts. When she grows for the first time, she looks 
down at her feet and tells them goodbye: “‘Oh, my poor little feet, I wonder who will put on your 
shoes and stocking for you now, dears?” (16). She then discusses how she will send them boots 
for Christmas and how she would address the package with the boots to her feet (17). These 
conversations between Alice and her limbs serve to continue the fragmentation of her self-
conceptualization of her identity. 
Alice’s self-conception of identity as intimately linked to body continues through her 
growing confusion as she keeps growing and shrinking through the narrative. When the 
Caterpillar asks her who she is, she responds, “‘I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I 
know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have changed several times since 
then’… ‘I ca’n’t understand it myself, to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day 
is very confusing’” (41). Part of the issue, from Alice’s perspective, is the constant fluctuations 
in size; when the Caterpillar asks what size that she wants to be, she replies that, for her, the size 
does not matter, as long she stays that size (45), indicating that what Alice really wants is 
stability in her identity through stability in her physical body, thus returning her to her fixed 
identity within dominant discourse. 
Alice’s identity confusion as the result of physical change becomes a site of cognitive 
dissonance through the doubling of Alice’s inner monologue into a dialogue, furthering the idea 
of fracture as the result of the changes in physical representation. Alice begins to speak to herself 
as to a separate person: “this curious child was very fond of pretending to be two people” (15). 
She even begins to wonder if she really is Alice and not another person altogether:  
‘I wonder if I’ve been changed in the night? Let me think: was I the same when I got up 
this morning? I almost think I can remember feeling a little different. But if I’m not the 
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same, the next question is ‘Who in the world am I?’ Ah, that’s the great puzzle!’ And she 
began thinking over all the children she knew that were of the same age as herself, to see 
if she could have been changed for any of them (18). 
 
She goes on to think if she has transformed into one of the other children that she knows, 
basing her conclusions on the characteristics that she most associates with them: she is not Ada 
because her hair is not curly, and she is not Mabel because she is intelligent—again, here Alice 
relies on the dominant discourse assumption that interior and exterior characteristics constitutes 
identity in the same way Butler argues that it does not. Furthermore, Alice says that the 
difference between herself and Mabel is that “she’s a she, and I’m I” (18). In this moment in the 
text, the uncontrollable changes in physical representation strip away Alice’s relationship 
between identity and interior/exterior characteristics that supposedly construct identity. All Alice 
is sure of in this scene is that there is an I as opposed to a she: Alice is convinced that she is a 
person, but she is no longer sure of what makes up that person. All she has left is a sense that 
there is an I who is different from others. She knows that there is a person thinking (her) and a 
person being discussed (also her), but she is unsure now of the relationship between what creates 
identity and what her identity is due to the fluctuations in the representation of her body, causing 
a fragmentation in identity and cognitive dissonance. Abbas and Rahman give a possible 
explanation for this identity doubling to be in the way that Alice as a character “is shuttling 
between two worlds her physical world that we term as real world and the world of the textual 
narrative into which she has landed” (7). This doubling here is the result of a cognitive 
dissonance between the schema of the “real world” Alice who knows that such growth and 
shrinkage cannot be possible (and that one cannot send packages to one’s own limbs) and is 
terrified of these developments and the schema of the “text” Alice who is calmly accepting all of 
these new developments as possible because they are happening undeniably in her own body, 
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thus continuing the fragmentation of her sense of identity.   
The narrator’s inclusion of this part of Alice that calmly accepts all these events as 
happening, despite the terror that the cognitive dissonance of identity loss brings her, actually 
allows the reader to contemplate this identity fragmentation without becoming afraid of or for 
her. Rackin points out that many of the events that occur during Alice’s journey should be more 
terrifying than funny (almost drowning in her own tears, encountering unsympathetic adult 
figures, falling a great height into a rabbit hole, etc) (104). Nancy Willard argues that the 
narrator’s (and Alice’s) calm, matter of fact reaction to the events around her indicate that she is 
in a dream which allows the reader to mitigate their understanding of Alice’s danger by realizing 
that the threat that the other characters and her environment pose to her can never be realized as 
it exists in a state of play, and her conversations between her doubled identity “interrupt the 
narrative and diffuse the sense of isolation and helplessness (55). In other words, through the 
juxtaposition of the tranquility of Alice’s reactions with the sheer fantastic-ness of her journey 
through Wonderland, Alice’s loss of a sense of fixed identity becomes one to laugh at instead of 
to fear, disrupting the reader’s schema in a way that allows the reader to experience Alice’s 
cognitive dissonance along with her without becoming terrified. 
What furthers this schema disruption on the part of Alice’s self-conceptualization of her 
own identity as a separate entity from other identities is the way that other characters often 
mistake her for someone or something else. The White Rabbit calls her Mary-Ann (34), the 
Pigeon argues that she is a serpent (48), and the Cheshire Cat says that she is mad. Turner 
attributes this trend of mistaken identity to the adult role that these characters play in relation to 
the child Alice: “They use this control in a very adult way too: they exercise the adult’s right to 
tell the child what she is,” reflecting the way that adult authors of children’s literature often seek 
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to tell the audience what a child is. She goes on to point out that Alice is unable to convince the 
Pigeon of her identity as a female child because of the “physical and mental changes” that have 
occurred in the narrative. Instead, the “adult” characters get to impose their versions of her 
identity through the authority granted to them through linguistic control (249). This treatment of 
the female character as a child in a world of adults (the majority of which are masculine 
authority figures) reflects what Cixous calls the tendency to conflate the identity of the woman 
and the child in dominant discourse. She writes that dominant discourse seeks to frame women 
as “still close to childhood, needing good manners—conventions that keep them under control. 
They have to be taught how to live” (29). The Wonderland characters also try to exert their 
control over the physical representation of Alice using this adult/child paradigm not only by 
telling her what her identity is but by telling her how her body (visual representation) needs to 
change to fit their standards. The Mad Hatter tells her, “Your hair wants cutting” (Carroll 60) and 
the Mock-Turtle asks her if she studies washing (85). This attitude of control over Alice’s body, 
when combined with the scholarship on the pathologizing and control of the mad female body 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, illustrates the control that these characters seek to 
have over her body, the female body that represents a threat to their dominant discourse through 
its madness. 
Of course, speaking of the adult/child paradigm in a novel written during the Victorian 
age is rather tricky as the construction of those terms were still forming during that time. The 
term adolescence cannot be used to describe Alice as that idea was not really formed until the 
20th century. The idea of the child as a construction is also a classed one: Lydia Murdoch 
discusses how at the beginning of Alice we understand that she is an upper-class child in 
Victorian England because she has time for leisure activities such as reading outside with her 
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sister, and the reader is reminded of this understanding throughout the novel because Alice 
herself keeps reminding the characters of her education (which includes French and music). 
Lower-class children were part of the labor force and often had to work alongside their parents in 
textile factories or in mines (Murdoch 13-14). Murdoch argues that Carroll was participating in a 
reshaping of the child as a construct to better fit with Victorian ideals of “domesticity”: rebelling 
against the moralism in children’s verse and prose that often painted working class children as 
corrupt and in need of education (much like hysterical women) (15-16). Although she notes that 
Carroll’s visual representations of Alice Liddell in photography reveals his class bias in regards 
to children (Alice dressed as a “beggar child” look much more adult and sexual than when she is 
dressed “in her best”), Murdoch writes, “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland marks the shift in 
Victorian ideals of childhood from work, discipline, and essential sinfulness to education, play, 
and innocence, however fleeting” (17). Thus, Carroll participates in molding a more modern 
construction of the child as an innocent and as a separate entity from an adult. 
However, Alice’s changes and their subsequent fragmentation of her self-
conceptualization of her identity speak to how problematized separation of these adult and child 
identities are. When Alice grows and fills the room in the White Rabbit’s house, she says “when 
I grow up, I’ll write one [a book]—but I’m grown up now…at least there’s no room to grow up 
any more here…shall I never get any older than I am now? That’ll be a comfort, one way—never 
to be an old woman—but then—always to have lessons to learn!” (33). Alice’s self-
conceptualization of her identity of that of a child comes from a conflation of ideas about size 
and age. On the one hand, she knows that size is related to the idea of adult status, thus by 
growing she is now “grown up” (at least in the space that she finds herself in). On the other hand, 
she recognizes that age also is linked to adult status, so the fact that she has not aged creates 
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cognitive dissonance with the fact that she has grown, causing yet another disruption in her 
schema of what it means to be an adult. At the end of the novel, the concept of growth as linked 
to adult status allows her to gain adult authority over her environment. Turner writes that when 
she wins the argument with the King of Hearts that her identity shifts towards being an adult in 
this scene due to size, “Until this point, her attempts to point out logical inconstancies have been 
ignored or shouted down. It is only when she possesses an advantage in size, much as an adult 
over a child, that she confidently believes that Wonderland’s logic is faulty” (247). Thus, Alice, 
as a child character, can gain adult authority through a change in her visual representation to 
reflect an adult identification marker (size). 
This schema confusion and disruption of what it means to be an adult reveals how much 
visual representation is linked to the idea of adulthood (and adult authority) in dominant 
discourse. By conflating the ideas of size and age (and then ultimately using this conflation to 
her benefit), Alice becomes a child/adult character, existing in neither world and both 
simultaneously. This representation calls into question ideas in dominant discourse concerning 
the positioning of both children and adults as binary identities, one subordinate to the other. This 
development also calls into question the child-status of the mad female character in the text, for 
here is a character who is framed by the author and the text as a child in need of education but 
she gains authority by the rules of the dominant discourse which set up the adult/child paradigm 
in the first place, while still technically remaining a child. By occupying both positions in the 
discourse, she causes the binary to collapse, thus subverting the system. 
The visual representations of Alice by Tenniel in the illustrations of the character and 
their criticism by Carroll reveal both Carroll’s and Tenniel’s individual and somewhat 
conflicting interpretations of Alice as a child/adult. Tenniel’s images of these physical changes 
73 
 
are not proportional (see fig. 6) intentionally distorting the representation of Alice as neither 
adult nor child. Martin Gardner in The 
Annotated Alice points out that Carroll 
was disappointed with Tenniel’s 
illustrations of Alice, saying he got her 
proportions wrong (82). Carroll’s concern 
indicates that he as the author would like 
complete control over Alice’s visual 
representation, keeping her proportionally 
a child while changing her size, 
effectively leaning more towards the positioning of Alice as a child caught in an adult world 
rather than as a child/adult character. 
To borrow the words of Gilbert and Gubar, Carroll is here attempting to “kill” the 
character Alice into his construction of the child (14). Turner argues that all child characters who 
are written by adults are in fact constructions of childhood or “an adult hiding behind a 
representation of a child” (252). It is impossible for an adult writing about a child character to 
write about a real child because there is a “gap” between the fiction of the child (as imagined by 
the adult) and the “‘real’ child outside the book (244). Cixous explains this construction of the 
child as “the mirror of the adult; the fairy mirror that gives the right answer” (27). As mentioned 
before, Carroll’s construction of the child is formed by his desire for Alice to maintain 
intellectual and sexual innocence: Veronica Schanoes points out that Carroll in his poetry 
preceding and following the text of Through the Looking Glass links Alice’s impending sexual 
and marital experiences with death, and that the physical changes in Alice’s Adventures in 
Figure 6. Alice grows in the White Rabbit's House. 
Here, Alice's head and limbs are not proportional 
(Carroll and Tenniel 33). 
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Wonderland are often marked by near death experiences. She writes, “Despite Carroll’s unhappy 
poetry, Alice Liddell was not dead in 1871, when Looking Glass was published. Indeed, she was 
alive and well at the age of 19. Dodgson’s close relationships with little girls sometimes, though 
not always, ended when the child-friends entered puberty…Dodgson kept his fictional Alice in 
prepubescence” (37). Carroll, by writing Alice as a perpetual child, in effect, is attempting to 
save her from this fate, but in doing so, ends up killing her anyway into a “phantom” that haunts 
him (37). The fantasy of keeping the child Alice pure ends up linked to death in another form, 
that of killing the real woman into his construction of the ideal/angel woman, which, in his case, 
is a construction of childhood. This construction of Carroll’s even further links the figure of the 
woman with the figure of the child. 
However, Tenniel’s visual representations of Alice through his illustrations form a more 
complex relationship between the changes in size and Alice’s 
positioning as a child/adult, allowing for the interpretation of Alice as 
an adult/child and opening up the “gap” that Turner argues exists 
between the fictional and real child in the schema of the reader. Even 
Carroll’s original drawing for this scene distorts the image of Alice, 
according to Rackin, thus undermining his complaint concerning 
Tenniel’s illustration. The visual representations here resist the 
characterization of Alice as a perpetual child by making her image 
disproportionate (see fig. 7), which disrupts readers’ (and Carroll’s) 
schema of what a child or adult should look like, thus denying any 
attempt to inscribe an interpretation of her identity on her body by the 
reader. The construction of the child as innocent is mixed with the 
Figure 7. Alice's 
disproportionate body 




growth associated with adulthood and maturation, resulting in a monstrous image (the Pidgeon 
even calls her a snake), recalling some of the images associated with the social anxiety about 
mad women in Gilbert and Gubar’s explorations. However, this monstrous image does not 
frighten the reader because Alice is inherently a likeable character; instead, we laugh because the 
image itself illustrates the short circuit between the supposedly universal concepts of adulthood 
and childhood and the concrete human body, which looks absurd when visualized. 
This subversion of the interpretative framework that dominant discourse often utilizes the 
female body in its construction of identity opens the possibility for new kinds of identification 
and undermines the authority of the dominant discourse to tell a child/woman what she is. As in 
the last chapter, however, a problem with this subversion occurs with the conclusion of the novel 
in which Alice wakes up from her dream, again resuming a child positioning in a world of 
authority figures. 
Delight to Delirium: Visual Fluidity 
Delirium as a more overtly mad female character brings this discussion of visual 
representation and the fragmentation of identity through the discourses of madness, gender, and 
women’s movements of the end of the twentieth century (discourses that did not exist in the 
context of Carroll’s novel). The concept of adolescence as a developmental period between 
childhood and adulthood had been formed in scholarship and cultural mindsets before Delirium 
was written; therefore, in our ongoing juxtaposition of the two characters, we can see Delirium 
as a continuation and modification of those themes of visual representation and fragmentation of 
identity in light of this change in context. Her first appearance in the The Sandman text was in 
the 21st issue which was published in December of 1990, the same year as Butler’s Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Although it is difficult to know if Gaiman was 
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inspired by or responding to the types of queer performative gender identity theories that Butler 
is famous for, her text provides us insight into the type of identity subversion that Delirium as a 
character embodies through the numerous identity shifts through fluctuations in her visual 
representation. Delirium provides more overt points of subversion to the ideology concerning the 
fixed nature of identity than Alice, indicating a progression in the ways that female mad 
characters can act as sites of subversion to dominant discourse. While Alice’s fluctuations in 
visual representation blur the boundaries between child and adult identities, Delirium more 
directly disrupts the idea of fixed identity based on representation, creating an unstable 
relationship between her physical body and the construction of her identity either by herself or 
others, including the reader. There are two types of shifts in physical form emphasized in the 
series concerning Delirium. One is the constant fluidity of her form as Delirium; the other is the 
shift between her previous identity as Delight to her current one as Delirium. 
Delirium, like Alice, encounters many changes in her visual representation; however, 
Delirium’s physical changes are not in height, but the images of her are constantly changing, 
sometimes mid-frame. She, like Alice, is also framed as a child/adult (or in twentieth century 
terms, adolescence) (Season of Mists) (551). She is much shorter in height than the rest of her 
family; she is constantly looking up at them when in dialogue; however, her position of authority 
as one of the mythological Endless and the overt sexuality of her character through clothing 
choices (though Delirium herself shows almost no interest in sex and could be read as an asexual 
or queer character) position her in the realm of the adult (much has been written about how Alice 
is sexualized by Carroll as well). Like Carroll’s framing of Alice as a female character “killed” 
into a child forever, Delirium’s characterization as a perpetual adolescent is framed as a tragedy 
as well (551). She is viewed by the other members of the Endless as their kid baby sister: some 
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are protective of her (especially Death and Destruction), others dismissive. Rarely is her 
voice/discourse taken seriously or in any way as authoritative, and much of this is due to her 
positioning in the text as a child/adolescent to the adult figures of the other Endless. 
Like Alice, the identity of Delirium is based on the change in visual representation is also 
marked by fragmentation, both of her self-conceptualization of her own identity and the way the 
other characters conceptualize her identity. The only other constant in Delirium’s appearance 
besides her frozen adolescence are her “badly matched” eyes: “one eye is a vivid emerald green, 
spattered with silver flecks that move; her other eye is vein blue” (551). As I have discussed in 
previous chapters, Delirium tends to physically disincarnate, again emphasizing the 
fragmentation of her visual representation. She does this in response to Desire’s “pull yourself 
together” and in another scene in Brief Lives when she searches from Destruction mentally by 
allowing herself to look for him through the minds of 
others (thus blurring the lines between herself and 
other bodies in a similar way that Alice does with 
Mabel) (see fig. 8). These moments of disincarnation 
seem to provide a possible answer to Alice’s 
question of what would happen if she shrunk out of 
existence like the snuffing out of the candle flame: 
Delirium’s fractured psyche is linked to the 
disintegration of her physical body and the 
fragmentation of the idea of a fixed identity. 
However, it is in the transition from the Delight identity to the Delirium identity and the 
changes in visual representation that truly question the use of the body as an interpretive lens for 
Figure 8. Delirium disincarnates or "lets 
herself go" (210). 
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identity. Readers do not get much of an impression of the 
Delight identity outside of her physical representation: the 
most we get to see of Delight occurs in flashback scenes 
when she is already beginning to change into the identity of 
Delirium, so it is difficult to discuss any characteristics 
besides the visual representations of the character. The first 
representation of Delight in is a portrait that Destiny keeps 
in his study, and is strikingly like the one that many readers 
associate with Alice (especially as drawn by Tenniel): long 
wavy hair, blue dress with long skirt and sleeves, pink sash 
around her waist, etc. This portrait associates Delight with 
traditional ideas of femininity and middle to upper class children in the Victorian era (see fig. 9). 
Other representations of Delight show her as anywhere between a child and an adolescent, 
always in overtly traditional feminine garb and style of appearance. 
When Delirium is first introduced in Season of Mists, the juxtaposition between the 
images of the Delight/Delirium identities is the first impression that the reader has of the 
character. Destiny calls a meeting, and as each one of the Endless emerges from their portraits, 
they look almost exactly like their representations right down to the way they dress. However, 
when Destiny calls for Delirium through her portrait, the representation of her in the picture is 
one of her in figure 3—a young girl wearing a blue dress, with a straw hat and flowers in a 
landscape of green (Season of Mists 8). When she emerges from the portrait in the next frame at 
the top of the next page, her appearance is completely different. She now has a bright orange 
buzz-cut (a visual traditionally associated with masculine imagery), ripped fishnet stockings and 
Figure 9. Portrait of Delight in 
Destiny's gallery (8). 
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undershirt and a black leotard, reminiscent of Annie 
Lennox from her “Sweet Dreams” music video. Her 
overly large clothing (which seems to be a favorite on the 
part of Delirium) also emphasizes the adolescence of the 
character as well as accentuating the flatness of her chest 
and hips in contrast to the traditional feminine sexual 
characteristics of the Delight identity. To accentuate the 
change in representation even more, the portrait behind 
Delirium from which she emerges now only contains the 
white silhouette of Delight, indicating that the Delirium 
identity has eclipsed the previous one (see fig 10). The 
contrast between these two images in the same panel 
causes the reader to link the change from the Delight 
identity to the Delirium identity firmly with the idea of 
change in visual representation. The juxtaposition of the 
two visual representations also interacts with the idea of 
gender as a performative act in contrast to the dominant 
discourse which insists that gender identity is fixed. For our analysis of Delirium, this theoretical 
framework means that the idea of “woman” as a stable identity is a construction of the dominant 
ideology and reflects the performance of certain signifiers that have been deemed by that 
ideology to be appropriate to that identity. 
To subvert the role of the body in the interpretative framework of the dominant discourse 
even further, the reader is never told why Delight became Delirium; the process seems to have 
Figure 10. Delirium emerging from 
the portrait of Delight (9). 
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been both precipitated by a tragedy or trauma of some kind and also a long slow process that 
Delirium herself either had absolute control over (as indicated by her conversation with Destiny 
in which she says that she “stopped being Delight”) or she had no control over (as indicated by 
her conversation with Destruction in a flashback scene in Brief Lives). Mellette notes the 
omission as a gap that the reader can fill with “her or his experiences in her character” (64). 
However, he goes on to argue that the change is associated with “growing up or growing older,” 
(66) similar to the way that Alice’s changes in size are related to her growth from child to adult. 
He writes, “Her fall is emblematic of a general fall from innocence, an awakening of an 
undefined nature. Potentially a metaphor for blossoming sexuality, Adam and Eve’s expulsion 
from the Garden of Eden, or just recognition of the cruelty of the world itself…” (66). Here, 
Delirium’s change in visual representation mirrors the struggle in Carroll’s representation of 
Alice: to remain in the “innocent” child state forever is impossible. However, Gaiman, instead of 
killing Delirium into Delight forever, allows the character to mature into something else. 
What we do know is that none of the other Endless have changed in such a way: 
generally, if one of them dies, one of their potential replacements takes their place in order to fill 
the vacuum of their absence. This process has occurred at least twice; once with Despair and 
once with Dream (Destruction refuses to kill himself as he says that it would just be passing on 
his problem to someone else), illustrating the supposedly timeless and immutable characteristics 
of these personifications. In fact, Mellette cites Gaiman as once stating that the plot of The 
Sandman essentially is “The Lord of Dreams learns one must change or die, and makes his 
decision” (qtd. 72). By this definition, Delirium functions as a double to Dream: she does not die 
or wish to die, so she transforms from one identity to another but is still considered the same 
personification. Destruction even hints that such a transformation may again happen to her in the 
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future (cite), indicating that Delirium, of all the Endless, may continue to change and adapt. 
Bender quotes Gaiman stating that the character experiences multiple changes: “She’s been one 
thing, she’s become something else, and eventually she’ll change into something else again” 
(Gaiman qtd. 241). Delirium has mastered the lesson that Dream ultimately cannot learn, what 
Mellette describes as “the ability to endure” (73). 
When Delirium thinks of her past identity while waiting for Dream to return from his 
meeting with Desire in Brief Lives (see fig 11), this doubling of images reflects the doubling of 
identity that Alice experiences as the result of her size changes. While Delirium does not engage 
in an internal dialogue with herself the way that Alice does, she does interact with the image of 
her Delight identity through memory, causing her to realize a fracture in her self-
conceptualization based on the fracture in her concept of past and present. Mellette describes this 
image as illustrating how the stark change that has occurred in the character affects the change in 
the identity (66), but I would posit that this is another example of the kind of cognitive 
dissonance that Alice experiences in her novel. Here, Delirium is thinking about herself, 
remembering the exact moment when she realized that she “was no longer Delight” (166). She is 
now a self that is remembering another self who 
realized that she was no longer the self she used to 
be. The image here is not divided into panels (as 
Mellette notes) and does not have a gutter between 
the representations, allowing the reader to 
experience the cognitive dissonance with Delirium 
by holding the two images simultaneously in the 




character, thus again, undercutting the external signifiers that dominant discourse applies as 
constructions of identity. 
What is most intriguing is how Delirium’s self-conceptualization of her identity as fluid 
and fractured interacts with her sibling’s conception of her identity. For the most part, the other 
members of the Endless seem to refuse to acknowledge Delirium’s identity as a legitimate one, 
reflecting their belief in her fixed identity based on their idea that Delight is the “correct” 
identity. For one, the fact that Destiny has not updated any of his images of Delight to reflect her 
new identity as Delirium reflects his inability to accept this change. When Delirium looks at the 
image of herself as Delight and says that she was pretty, Dream’s response is that she used to be 
pretty, implying that she is not anymore. Almost all of the Endless refuse to call Delirium that 
name; they prefer the familiar nickname Del, which allows them the ambiguity of either meaning 
Delight or Delirium. These responses to Delirium’s change show that the identity of Delight is 
the preferred identity of the dominant discourse; the Delirium identity is not considered 
legitimate. This preference for the Delight identity over the Delirium identity reflects the idea of 
the mad woman as occupying a space of non-being inside the dominant discourse, but it also 
places Delirium outside of the norms prescribed for her identity by the dominant discourse in 
terms of Butler’s performativity of identity. 
For Delirium, the constant shifts in visual representation, beginning with the 
juxtaposition of the Delight and Delirium images as cognitive dissonance on the part of the 
reader and then continuing through the fluctuations in Delirium’s representation, challenges “the 
fantasy” (Butler 173) of a stable gender identity by confronting the reader’s ability to “read” the 
body in the way that Eisner says is necessary for the interpretation of image in graphic text. After 
all, this theory states that graphic art relies on the reader’s ability to recognize and decode images 
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based on schema or past experience. The way that a reader recognizes character in this theory is 
through repetition: the reader has seen the visual representation of the character previously and is 
able to identify the character (and thus creates character identity) through the existing schema the 
text and reader have created. For example, the character of Death in The Sandman is easily 
“read” by the reader because of her black hair, cat eye makeup, black clothing, and silver ankh 
around her neck that is her sigil. We as readers believe that Death is a woman in Gaiman’s 
universe because her visual representation fits into our schema of a “fixed” female identity: her 
performance of identity conforms to what dominant discourse defines as female. Most of the 
Endless are recognizable as characters in this way (although Desire does not have a stable gender 
identity; but that is another argument altogether): Destruction even calls the Endless “patterns” in 
his description of them (312). He means this description on a mythological anthropological level, 
but the word pattern can be applied to reader recognition and creation of character identity 
through visual representation. For the Endless, the ultimate pattern occurs in their sigils which 
function as symbolic representations of their characters: Destiny’s is a book, Death’s is the ankh, 
Dream’s is a helmet, Destruction’s is a sword, Desire’s is a glass heart, and Despair’s is a fish-
hook. These sigils represent characters in a way easily accessible to the reader because their 
meaning in this text is a fixed representation of identity. 
However, Delirium, with her shifting representations, challenges this way of recognizing 
identity through visual representation by confronting the idea of pattern in the recognition of 
character. To be sure, we as readers know that we are still viewing Delirium because of a certain 
amount of repetition on the part of the character (mainly through her multi-colored speech 
bubbles and her mismatched eyes). However, the amount of repetition is limited to only a few 
things: the reader has to check if the speech bubble is multi-colored in order to make sure that the 
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character is in fact Delirium and not another character. Thus, the boundaries between one 
character and another are blurred in the schema of the reader, a schema that relies heavily on 
visual identification of character. By playing with the schema in this way, the character of 
Delirium subverts the expectation of character recognition based on visual representation, thus 
exposing how much the reader relies on these images as clues to identity. It is perhaps fitting that 
she, unlike the other members of the Endless, does not have a fixed symbolic sigil, but rather her 
sigil is a field of shifting, shapeless color. 
Conclusion 
 We discussed in the previous chapter how the humor dependent on the subversion of 
linguistic constructions can disrupt the schema of the reader concerning the nature of 
epistemological authority in the previous chapter; the same theoretical framework can serve to 
discuss how these texts and their characters undermine the interpretative authority of dominant 
discourse to extrapolate identity from visual representation or body, specifically when it comes 
to madness. Alice and Delirium here show a progression of this type of character who resists 
through madness and humor, and who may begin to indicate new methods of identity instead of 
relying on biological or interior theories of identity construction. Delirium especially, as a more 
developed character who overtly addresses these concerns through her transformation from 
Delight to Delirium and through her fluid visual representations, suggests perhaps a move 
beyond a notion of identity that relies on even intersectional politics that seek, as Jasbir K. Puar 
says, “the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, relying on the 
logic of equivalence and analogy between various axes of identity and generating narratives of 
progress that deny the fictive and performative aspects of identification” (336). To borrow Puar’s 
terminology, Delirium de-stabilizes these constructions through the fragmentation of her 
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physical form and the constant shifting of her external characteristics in a way that causes the 
reader to constantly re-evaluate what it means to recognize a character and what it means to have 




Conclusion: A Call for Future Study 
 As I have mentioned several times now, this thesis is not an exhaustive study of mad 
female characters. It is not even an exhaustive study of the ways one could discuss Alice and 
Delirium. However, the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that this type of study is possible 
and to indicate the need for more. Characters like Harley Quinn, Luna Lovegood, Ellie from 
Skins all interact with the traditions of madness in ways that disidentify from the stereotypes that 
these traditions create and create disruptions in the reader’s schema that open the gaps in 
dominant discourse, allowing for subversion of that discourse. Part of this subversion, for some 
characters, is allowed by their placement in fantasy or imaginary settings. Saler says that the 
purpose of virtual imaginary worlds in modern society is manifold. He writes,  
On the one hand, imaginary worlds are autonomous from the real world, avowedly 
fictional spaces that provide an escape from a disenchanted modernity into self-subsistent 
realms of wonder. On the other hand, these worlds are inextricable from ordinary life and 
interpersonal engagements…they provide safe and playful arenas for their inhabitants to 
reflect on the status of the real and to discuss prospects for effecting concrete personal 
and social changes. They challenge their inhabitants to see the real world as being, to 
some degree, an imaginary construct amenable to revision. As a result of collectively 
inhabiting and elaborating virtual worlds, many become more adept as accepting 
difference, contingency, and pluralism: at envisioning life not in essentialist, “just so” 
terms but rather in provisional, “as if” perspectives (7). 
 
Saler’s vision of fantasy or “imaginary worlds” here is imbued with the idea of schema 
disruption on the part of the reader, constantly creating dissonance and refreshment, allowing 
new schemas to emerge. Instead of the “essentialist,” fixed views that dominant discourse often 
seeks in terms of epistemes and identity, fantasy often allows the reader to explore other views or 
ways of knowing which can cause them to challenge or revise the constructions of dominant 
discourse. Alice and Delirium as fantasy characters inhabiting fantastic worlds allow the reader 
to revise their ideas away from the essentialism and subjugation of women’s madness and humor 
by dominant discourse and towards an understanding of the alternate discourse that mad, funny 
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women can represent. Pedagogically, these kinds of characters and texts are important to teach 
because they allow students to encounter these schema disruptions with ideas of madness and to 
provide a place to discuss these conceptions of epistemology, representation, and identity. By 
teaching these texts, these characters, students can become better equipped to understand the 
influence of dominant ideology and to resist it. For students who struggle with issues of mental 
illness, they can relate to these characters and find empowerment through the subversion they 
represent. 
 To conclude, I would like to return to the image of the two-sided coin that Delirium 
claims represents different ways of knowing. Near the end of the series, Delirium reveals to 
Dream that she may in fact be more aware of how the existence of the Endless affects the fabric 
of reality than he is. She says, “I know LOTS of thinks. People think I DON’T but I REALLY 
do. I know more about us than ANY of us. That’s just one of the things I know” (717). Delirium 
represents a return to the parallel discourses of madness and reason, an understanding of the 
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